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NOTES 
ADDING UNCERTAINTY TO THE VIRTUAL 
SHOPPING CART:  ANTITRUST REGULATION 





Online commerce has fundamentally changed how consumers shop and 
how products are distributed.  As a result, manufacturers impose Internet 
Minimum Advertised Price (IMAP) policies, prohibiting internet retailers 
from advertising prices below a fixed amount.  Consumers often encounter 
these policies through website instructions such as “see price in cart,” “to 
view price, add to your shopping cart,” and “price unavailable—click to 
see more.”  Manufacturers argue that IMAP policies are non-price vertical 
restraints that do not run afoul of antitrust laws because they regulate only 
advertising.  However, IMAP policies can and do impact resale pricing, 
resulting in higher prices and unjustifiable limitations on consumer choice. 
Recent jurisprudence regarding price fixing, general uncertainty around 
the legality of resale price maintenance (RPM) under state and federal 
antitrust statutes, and high pleading standards have led to nearly 
insurmountable barriers for plaintiffs who raise antitrust challenges  to 
IMAP policies.  The Supreme Court held in 2007 that RPM may have 
procompetitive justifications, and should thus be analyzed using the rule of 
reason when challenged under federal antitrust law.  This Note examines 
the analysis of IMAP policies in the context of recent antitrust 
jurisprudence.  After a discussion of the relevant antitrust law and an 
analysis of recent IMAP litigation, this Note concludes that IMAP policies 
are sufficiently anticompetitive to justify per se prohibition and should be 







*  J.D. Candidate, 2013, Fordham University School of Law; B.A., 2008, Brandeis 
University.  Many thanks to Professor Mark Patterson for his guidance and for finding IMAP 
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and support. 
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INTRODUCTION 
It happened.  The new iPhone was just released.  Finally, after months of 
hype, a press conference, and countless scornful looks at your soon-to-be-
obsolete regular phone, the day has arrived.  Apple has been trumpeting the 
retail price for ages and it is far more than you want to pay, so you decide to 
look elsewhere.  As a tech-savvy consumer who knows that things are often 
cheaper online, you head straight to the internet and search for “new 
iPhone.”  Sure enough, you are linked to several websites selling the phone, 
but something is missing—the price.  In order to see the internet seller’s 
price, the page instructs you to first add the phone to an online shopping 
cart.  Some of the websites will not even display the price until you input 
your address and credit card information.  Perhaps, at this point, you call off 
the search and just decide to head to the Apple store. 
Whether searching for a new gadget or a replacement showerhead, 
instructions such as “see price in cart,” “to view price, add to your shopping 
cart,” and “price unavailable—click to see more” have become increasingly 
common for online shoppers.  The underlying reason for this inconvenience 
(or even deterrence to purchasing) is an Internet Minimum Advertised Price 
(IMAP) policy.  IMAP policies are set by manufacturers and prohibit 
retailers from advertising their products online below a fixed price.1  
Distributor violations of IMAP policies can lead to fewer manufacturer 
incentives, reduced supply, or termination of a distribution contract.2  
Manufacturers argue that these policies, like other non-price vertical 
restraints, do not fix a selling price, and are therefore valid under antitrust 
law.3
 
 1. See J. Thomas Rosch, Comm’r, FTC, Current Issues in Competition and Consumer 
Protection Enforcement in the Retail Sector, Remarks at the Retail Industry Leaders 
Association’s Retail Law Conference (Nov. 10, 2010), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/rosch/101110roschretailerspeech.pdf, at 22–23 [hereinafter 
Rosch Remarks]; see also infra Part I.C.3. 
  However, given recent jurisprudence regarding internet advertising 
 2. See, e.g., Riado Internet Minimum Advertised Price Policy ¶ 2, RIADO, 
http://www.riado.com/files/Riado.IMAP.Policy.pdf (last visited Feb. 23, 2012); see also 
infra Part I.C.3. 
 3. See An FTC Guide to Dealings in the Supply Chain:  Manufacturer-Imposed 
Requirements 1, FTC, http://www.ftc.gov/bc/antitrust/factsheets/factsheet_manafacturer.pdf 
(last modified July 8, 2008). 
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and uncertainty around the legality of resale price maintenance, these 
policies may in fact violate state and federal antitrust statutes.4
Antitrust law governs the conduct of organizations and individuals in 
order to promote competition in the marketplace.
 
5  Under state and federal 
antitrust statutes, businesses must refrain from engaging in conduct that 
impermissibly and unjustifiably restrains competition.6
Resale Price Maintenance
 
7 (RPM) is the result of an agreement among 
organizations at different levels of a supply chain to establish a product’s 
resale price.8  The legality of RPM has been the subject of significant 
judicial, public policy, and practical debate.9  After nearly 100 years of 
uncertain legal status,10 RPM was definitively held to be permissible—
subject to a rule of reason analysis—by the Supreme Court in 2007 in 
Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc.11
Even in light of this holding, discrepancies between state and federal 
antitrust legislation,
 
12 cautionary language in judicial decisions,13 and 
persistent arguments that RPM is anticompetitive14 have led to doubts in 
the contemporary regulation of RPM.  Additionally, the expansion of the 
internet has changed how businesses operate and how products are 
distributed.15  IMAP policies, regulating the prices at which products can be 
advertised on the internet, blur the lines between advertising and pricing, 
and the emergence of dominant online vendors has shifted the balance of 
traditional retail sales.16
 
 4. See infra Part II.A. 
 
 5. See DOUGLAS BRODER, U.S. ANTITRUST LAW AND ENFORCEMENT:  A PRACTICE 
INTRODUCTION 2 (2010); infra Part I.A. 
 6. See LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN & WARREN S. GRIMES, THE LAW OF ANTITRUST:  AN 
INTEGRATED HANDBOOK 7 (2000); infra Part I.B. 
 7. Resale Price Maintenance is also known as vertical price maintenance or vertical 
price fixing.  For the purposes of this Note, this conduct will be referred to as “Resale Price 
Maintenance” or “RPM.” 
 8. See Rosch Remarks, supra note 1, at 13; see also infra Part I.C.1. 
 9. ABA SEC. ANTITRUST L., 2007 ANNUAL REVIEW OF ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 
25–26 (2007). 
 10. After its initial characterization as per se illegal in Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. 
Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911), scholars offered numerous procompetitive rationales 
for RPM. See discussion supra Part I.D.2.a. 
 11. 551 U.S. 877 (2007) (overruling Dr. Miles and eliminating the rule that RPM is per 
se illegal). 
 12. See ABA SEC. ANTITRUST L., ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 796 (6th ed. 2007); 
see also infra Part I.B.3. 
 13. See Leegin, 551 U.S. at 894 (“As should be evident, the potential anticompetitive 
consequences of vertical price restraints must not be ignored or underestimated.”); infra Part 
I.D.3. 
 14. See infra Part I.D.2.a.; see also Leegin, 551 U.S. at 894. 
 15. See Marina Lao, Internet Retailing and “Free Riding”:  A Post-Leegin Antitrust 
Analysis, 14 J. INTERNET L., Mar. 2011, at 1, 16 (discussing the rapid growth of internet 
sales). See generally Note, Leegin’s Unexplored “Change in Circumstance”:  The Internet 
and Resale Price Maintenance, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1600 (2008) (discussing how online retail 
has fundamentally changed product distribution). 
 16. See Note, supra note 15, at 1619–21. 
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The proliferation of IMAP policies has already begun to generate 
puzzlement in the courts.17  Given the ambiguity regarding RPM’s 
legitimacy after Leegin, courts find themselves on shaky ground when 
analyzing questions regarding IMAP policies.18  IMAP presents a doubly 
complex analytical problem.  First, IMAP policies are typically analyzed 
under the RPM framework, and the legality of RPM is a contentious issue 
in antitrust regulation.19  Second, IMAP policies do not fit cleanly into the 
category of RPM.20
Part I of this Note explores the context of antitrust law in the United 
States, particularly the tumultuous history of resale price maintenance under 
state and federal antitrust statutes.  Part II lays out the conflict in regulation 
of IMAP policies, including the difficulties in categorizing IMAP, tensions 
between state and federal antitrust legislation, and uncertainty in applying 
rule of reason analysis after the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Leegin.  
Part III argues that IMAP policies are not the kind of procompetitive resale 
price maintenance the Court envisioned in Leegin, and should therefore be 
prohibited. 
  Ostensibly, IMAP policies regulate only advertised 
pricing, and as such, the applicability of RPM analysis in this context is 
even more uncertain. 
I.  PRICE FIXING THE OLD FASHIONED WAY:  TRADITIONAL ANTITRUST 
TREATMENT OF MANUFACTURER-IMPOSED REQUIREMENTS 
Part I of this Note provides the context under which IMAP policies are 
analyzed.  This section includes a brief history of antitrust law in the United 
States and a description of relevant state and federal statutes.  Additionally, 
Part I describes conduct prohibited by antitrust law, and how such conduct 
is handled by courts as either per se illegal or subject to rule of reason 
analysis.  This part also summarizes the history and current state of resale 
price maintenance in American antitrust law, and the implications of the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Leegin.  Finally, it provides a description of 
IMAP policies and justifications for implementing them. 
A.  Antitrust:  A Brief History 
Competition law, known in the United States as antitrust law, is the 
regulation of anticompetitive conduct in order to promote or maintain 
market competition.21
 
 17. See infra Part II. 
  This term originates from competition law’s initial 
objective:  to combat trusts (i.e., business entities formed with an intent to 
 18. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY:  THE LAW OF COMPETITION 
AND ITS PRACTICE 447–48 (2005). 
 19. See id. 
 20. See generally Campbell v. Austin Air Sys., Ltd., 423 F. Supp. 2d 61 (W.D.N.Y. 
2005). 
 21. See BRODER, supra note 5, at 2 (“The antitrust laws’ primary focus is marketplace 
competition.”). 
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monopolize), restrain trade, or fix prices.22  American antitrust law is based 
on a “commitment to the promotion of free enterprise and the existence of 
competition in the marketplace.”23  Federal and state antitrust statutes are 
designed with several goals in mind:  to promote vigorous competition in 
support of the free enterprise system, to protect and benefit consumers, and 
to establish a fair environment for competition.24
The “trust problem” emerged in the United States as a matter of public 
concern in the late nineteenth century.
 
25  During this time period, 
academics,26 occupational groups,27 and the press28 became frustrated with 
and increasingly vocal about the dramatic growth and questionable business 
practices of large organizations, particularly railroads.29  These large firms 
joined together to create powerful trusts.30  The high amount of initial 
capital required to construct railroads, coupled with rural construction 
locations, precluded competition, giving existing railroads unprecedented 
control over rates and services.31  Railroads engaged in numerous 
controversial practices, including the corporate creation and maintenance of 
trusts, pools, holding companies, and cartels.32  Additionally, these trusts 
were able to dominate multiple industries:  the Standard Oil trust in the 
1880s controlled markets in fuel oil, lead, and whiskey.33
The states were first to act.
 
34  Prior to the enactment of federal antitrust 
legislation in 1890, “at least 26 states already had some form of antitrust 
prohibition,” generally via statute or constitutional provision.35
 
 22. See JOHN MOODY, THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TRUSTS:  A DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS OF 
THE AMERICAN TRUST MOVEMENT xii–xiv (1904); SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 
  Although 
they resulted in scattered instances of enforcement, state actions did not 
effectively remedy the trusts’ wide-scale corporate misconduct.  Non-
uniform development of state law, a “lack of coordinated and aggressive 
public prosecution, and . . . the lack of adequate penalties” seriously 
weakened the ability of states to effectively police anticompetitive 
6, at 7. 
 23. 1 EARL W. KINTNER, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW § 1.1, at 1 (1980). 
 24. ELIOT G. DISNER, ANTITRUST:  QUESTIONS, ANSWERS, LAW AND COMMENTARY 15–16 
(3d ed. 2007). 
 25. See 1 KINTNER, supra note 23, § 4.2, at 132–33. 
 26. See HANS B. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY:  ORIGINATION OF AN 
AMERICAN TRADITION 311–29 (1954) (describing scholarly approaches to economic theory 
in light of business consolidation in the 1890s). 
 27. See id. at 343–52 (analyzing the opposition of farmers and labor unions to corporate 
combinations in restraint of trade). 
 28. See id. at 329–43 (discussing how the late 1800s saw a dramatic increase in the 
number of articles devoted to criticism of monopolization and related corporate behavior). 
 29. See 1 KINTNER, supra note 23, § 4.2, at 129. 
 30. See SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 6, at 6. 
 31. See ANESTIS S. PAPADOPOULOS, THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION OF EU 
COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY 9–10 (2010). 
 32. See 1 KINTNER, supra note 23, § 4.2, at 129; accord John J. Binder, The Sherman 
Antitrust Act and the Railroad Cartels, 31 J.L. & ECON. 443, 444 (1988). 
 33. PAPADOPOULOS, supra note 31, at 10. 
 34. 1 KINTNER, supra note 23, § 4.2, at 129–30. 
 35. ABA SEC. ANTITRUST L., STATE ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT HANDBOOK 4 (2d ed. 
2008). 
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behavior.36  Enforcement resources were extremely limited in comparison 
to those of the massive corporations targeted by state legislation.  
Additionally, jurisdictional issues plagued attempts to enforce antitrust 
measures consistently.37  In this context, the Fiftieth and Fifty-First 
Congresses worked to develop and enact a comprehensive federal antitrust 
statute:  the Sherman Act.38
B.  Development of State and Federal Statutory Antitrust Oversight 
 
The Sherman Act and comparable state antitrust statutes (for example, 
New York’s Donnelly Act39) offer a starting point for analysis of the 
validity of resale price maintenance.  Developed in reaction to 
anticompetitive business practices of large organizations in the late 
nineteenth century, these statutes were intended to “curb the power and 
monopolistic abuses of the trusts that had come to dominate the American 
economic scene.”40  Legislative history, the statutes themselves, and 
jurisprudence under state and federal antitrust statutes have guided the 
modern understanding of when and how vertical agreements including 
RPM can be used in business practices.41
Although there are slight differences between the Sherman Act and some 
state statutes, state and federal antitrust legislation typically proscribe two 
categories of anticompetitive conduct, agreements in restraint of trade and 
monopolization.
  This section first addresses the 
general development of antitrust legislation in the United States, and then 
describes the elements of the Sherman Act and relevant state antitrust 
statutes. 
42  All business practices subject to antitrust scrutiny can be 
governed by three possible legal rules:  per se illegality, rule of reason 
analysis, or per se legality.43  Some conduct has been classified as per se 
illegal under the Sherman Act, and as such, is subject to very little judicial 
scrutiny before the conduct is deemed unenforceable or in violation of the 
statute.44
 
 36. WILLIAM R. ANDERSEN & C. PAUL ROGERS III, ANTITRUST LAW:  POLICY AND 
PRACTICE 8 (2d ed. 1992).  By the Sherman Act’s enactment in 1890, Arkansas, Connecticut, 
Georgia, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Montana, North Carolina, North Dakota, South 
Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Washington, and Wyoming had adopted anti-monopoly 
constitutional provisions. 1 KINTNER, supra note 23, § 4.2, at 130 n.23.  At this time, Iowa, 
Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, North Carolina, 
North Dakota, South Dakota, Tennessee, and Texas had enacted antitrust statutes. Id. § 4.2, 
at 130 n.24. 
  Other types of conduct require a deeper analysis, known as the 
 37. See 1 KINTNER, supra note 23, § 4.2, at 130. 
 38. See id. §§ 4.3, 4.5; at 139–44, 152–57; see also ANDERSEN & ROGERS, supra note 36, 
at 8 (“The state of the common law at the end of the century demanded federal action.”). 
 39. N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 340 (McKinney 2009). 
 40. ANDERSON & ROGERS, supra note 36, at 23–24. 
 41. See BRODER, supra note 5, at 35–37. 
 42. See id. at 15–16. 
 43. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 18, at 477. 
 44. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX:  A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 18 
(1978) (“Behavior is illegal per se when the plaintiff need prove only that it occurred in 
order to win his case, there being no other elements to the offense and no allowable 
defense.”). 
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“rule of reason,” that takes into account market effects and the 
circumstances of particular industries to justify the imposition of potentially 
anticompetitive policies.45
This section describes conduct generally prohibited under state and 
federal antitrust statutes, and then summarizes how courts analyze business 
practices using the per se or rule of reason test. 
 
1.  General Principles of Antitrust Statutes and the Sherman Act 
Antitrust legislation reflects a careful balance between “necessary 
business arrangements having primarily reasonable objectives and effects” 
and those which are “unduly restrictive and attributable to anticompetitive 
motives.”46  Antitrust statutes in the United States are broad and malleable, 
necessitating a review of relevant legislative history to understand the 
underlying goals and intentions.47  Generally, antitrust statutes contain 
terms, such as “restraint of trade,” “monopolize,” “contract” and 
“combine,” that were familiar to the American population in the late 1800s, 
but these terms are not explicitly defined in statutory language.48  
 According to Justice Thurgood Marshall, “Antitrust laws . . . are the 
Magna Carta of free enterprise.  They are as important to the preservation of 
economic freedom and our free-enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to 
the protection of our fundamental personal freedoms.”49  In the United 
States, the Sherman Act is the country’s foundational antitrust statute.50  
Additionally, forty-eight states and the District of Columbia have enacted 
their own antitrust statutes.51  Antitrust statutes direct themselves “not 
against conduct which is competitive, even severely so, but against conduct 
which unfairly tends to destroy competition itself.”52  The intention of the 
Sherman Act was to promote “full and free competition” in interstate and 
foreign commerce by removing artificial or monopolistic restraints on the 
free operation of the market.53  The Sherman Act does not expressly 
mention specific rationales for imposing its prohibitions, and for this 
reason, legislative history is particularly relevant.54
 The record of Sherman Act congressional proceedings reflects several 
motives for developing and implementing comprehensive antitrust statutes 
 
 
 45. Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Making Sense of the Rule of Reason:  A New Standard for 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1753, 1754 (1994). 
 46. 1 KINTNER, supra note 23, § 4.18, at 240–41. 
 47. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 18, at 49. 
 48. 1 PHILLIP AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW:  AN ANALYSIS OF 
ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 14 (1978). 
 49. United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972). 
 50. See PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 40 (3d ed. 2006); 
RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 33 (2d ed. 2001). 
 51. See Michael A. Lindsay, Overview of State RPM, ANTITRUST SOURCE, Apr. 2011, 
available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/antitrust_law/source_
lindsay_chart.authcheckdam.pdf. 
 52. Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 458 (1993). 
 53. 1 KINTNER, supra note 23, § 4.18, at 238 (quoting Senator Sherman in early drafts of 
the Sherman Act). 
 54. See id. 
2012] ANTITRUST REGULATION OF IMAP POLICIES 1687 
in the late nineteenth century.  The most obvious goal, as perceived by the 
general public was to create “a weapon to be used against [railroad, oil, 
sugar and whiskey] combinations” which had collectively raised prices and 
created barriers to market entry.55  More specific goals included preventing 
high prices related to monopoly or cartel activity and protecting 
individuals’ rights to practice a vocation or trade.56  Over time, the Sherman 
Act has evolved to achieve contemporary economic goals, such as 
efficiency and fostering innovation; these modern goals, however, were not 
major factors in the early congressional debates and record.57
a.  Elements of the Sherman Act 
 
The Sherman Act contains two main sections.  Section 1 specifically 
regulates agreements.  This section condemns agreements in restraint of 
trade, including all contracts, combinations, and conspiracies that tend to 
reduce competition.58  Section 2 prohibits active behavior linked to 
monopoly or monopolization.59  Both provisions were written broadly, and 
much of the United States’ modern antitrust law was developed through 
evolving judicial interpretation of the Sherman Act’s broad proscriptions.60
The breadth and flexibility of the Sherman Act has allowed for 
continuous adjustment based on social, economic, and political climates.
 
61  
The practical approach taken by the courts has allowed the Sherman Act to 
remain relevant and effective despite major economic changes over the past 
century.62  The application and relevance of antitrust laws and their 
enforcement has been compared to a pendulum, oscillating between high 
and low enforcement based upon global economic sentiments.63  Few cases 
were brought in the first few years following the Sherman Act’s passage.64  
The “fervor of the trustbusters,” however, led to strong enforcement in the 
early twentieth century, followed by limited application during the Great 
Depression and World War II.65  In the late twentieth century and through 
today, some have linked the nature and degree of antitrust enforcement to 
political ideology, with limited application under Presidents Reagan, 
George H.W. Bush, and George W. Bush, and more vigorous enforcement 
under the Clinton and Obama administrations.66
 
 55. SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 
 
6, at 6. 
 56. See id. 
 57. See BORK, supra note 44, at 21; SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 6, at 6. 
 58. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006); see also SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 6, at 6. 
 59. 15 U.S.C. § 2; see also SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 6, at 6–7. 
 60. See SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 6, at 7. 
 61. See BRODER, supra note 5, at 3 (“Although the basic concepts of antitrust . . . have 
long been clear, the courts’ and the regulatory authorities’ interpretation of the laws has 
continuously evolved.”); see also SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 6 at 7. 
 62. See 1 KINTNER, supra note 23, § 4.18, at 239. 
 63. See BRODER, supra note 5, at 5. 
 64. See POSNER, supra note 50, at 36 tbl.1 (Antitrust Cases Filed by U.S. Department of 
Justice, 1890–99). 
 65. BRODER, supra note 5, at 5. 
 66. See, e.g., id. at 5–6. 
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b.  Sherman Act Prohibitions 
The first two sections of the Sherman Act represent the primary sources 
of antitrust regulation.  Although additional sections define jurisdiction,67 
address joinder of parties,68 and discuss foreign commerce,69 sections 1 and 
2 represent the crux of the statute.  Section 1 of the Sherman Act broadly 
prohibits “[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or 
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or 
with foreign nations.”70  Section 2 of the Sherman Act regulates 
monopolization, stating that “[e]very person who shall monopolize, or 
attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or 
persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the 
several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a 
felony.”71  Shortly after the Sherman Act’s passage, the Supreme Court 
observed that simple restraint of competition cannot make a business 
practice illegal because “[e]very agreement concerning trade, every 
regulation of trade, restrains.”72  For this reason, courts often look into the 
effects of particular types of agreements and business practices to interpret 
their validity under antitrust law.73
In order to state a valid section 1 Sherman Act claim, a plaintiff must 
sufficiently allege that an agreement has taken place.
 
74  According to the 
Supreme Court in Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp,75 to prove an 
agreement, a plaintiff must provide “evidence that tends to exclude the 
possibility of independent action” and shows a “conscious commitment to a 
common scheme.”76  Although “[t]he Sherman Act, unlike most traditional 
criminal statutes, does not, in clear and categorical terms, precisely identify 
the conduct which it proscribes,”77
 
 67. 15 U.S.C. § 4 (2006). 
 courts have established categories of 
prohibited conduct that unreasonably and unjustifiably restrain trade.  
Examples of clearly proscribed behavior include price fixing (setting 
 68. Id. § 5. 
 69. Id. § 6a. 
 70. Id. § 1. 
 71. Id. § 2. 
 72. Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918); see also Orson, 
Inc. v. Miramax Film Corp., 79 F.3d 1358, 1366 (3d Cir. 1996) (citing Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. 
Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 723 (1988) (“Virtually all business agreements restrain 
trade to some extent; section 1, therefore, has been construed to make illegal only those 
contracts that constitute unreasonable restraints of trade.”). 
 73. See ABA SEC. ANTITRUST L., MONOGRAPH NO. 23:  THE RULE OF REASON 1 (1999); 
see also BRODER, supra note 5, at 3. 
 74. See ABA SEC. ANTITRUST L., PROOF OF CONSPIRACY UNDER FEDERAL ANTITRUST 
LAWS xiii (2010) (“Without an agreement, there is no need for further application of Section 
1.”); see also, e.g., Theatre Enters. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537 (1954) 
(holding that even with clear evidence of parallel behavior, a plaintiff must additionally 
show concerted action or agreement). 
 75. 465 U.S. 752 (1984). 
 76. Id. at 768. 
 77. United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 438 (1978). 
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prices),78 market allocations (splitting up a specific market),79 and group 
boycotts.80  Conduct that is suspect under section 1 but does not fall into 
categories of codified per se illegal behavior is subject to more in-depth, 
rule of reason analysis.81
The Sherman Act regulates monopolies and monopolization in section 2.  
“Monopoly power is the power to control prices or exclude competition.”
 
82  
In order to prove a violation of section 2, a plaintiff must show that the 
defendant has (1) possession of monopoly power in the relevant market and 
(2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished 
from growth or “development as a consequence of a superior product, 
business acumen, or historic accident.”83
The Sherman Act was not intended to prevent the growth of successful 
businesses; courts therefore distinguish between coercive and innocent 
monopoly.
  A section 2 claim does not 
require evidence of an agreement between parties. 
84  Obtaining monopoly power because of a particularly 
successful product or reasonable and effective business practices does not 
subject an organization to liability under section 2.85  If a plaintiff can prove 
“willfulness”—that the organization acted impermissibly to retain or secure 
monopoly power—the organization is subject to antitrust liability.86
2.  State Antitrust Statutes 
 
In addition to federal antitrust regulation under the Sherman Act, forty-
eight states and the District of Columbia have enacted antitrust laws.87  
These laws evolved out of the same political and historical rationales as the 
Sherman Act, and many existing state statutes served as foundations for 
federal legislation and enforcement as the Sherman Act was being 
developed.88
 
 78. See, e.g., N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) (discussing the 
permissibility of horizontal price fixing). 
 
 79. See generally United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596 (1972); United States v. 
Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967); Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 
(1951); Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899). 
 80. See generally Silver v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 365–66 (1963); Radiant 
Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656, 659–60 (1961); Klor’s, Inc. v. 
Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959). 
 81. See BORK, supra note 44, at 18. 
 82. United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956). 
 83. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966). 
 84. See SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 6, at 101. 
 85. See BRODER, supra note 5, at 91 (“Though the antitrust laws will not punish those 
who earn their monopolies through effective business practices or through simple good luck, 
they do not tolerate those who cheat . . . to obtain a monopoly or to maintain it.”). 
 86. Id. See generally United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966) 
(differentiating “willful acquisition” of monopoly power from organic development). 
 87. Lindsay, supra note 51.  In addition, Montana has enacted a statute prohibiting price 
fixing but has no general antitrust statute. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-14-205 (2007).  
Pennsylvania has no statute, but permits the use of common law remedies to combat antitrust 
violations. See Lindsay, supra note 51. 
 88. See ABA SEC. ANTITRUST L., supra note 35, at 4 (discussing the foundations of 
federal antitrust legislation, including the per se rule against price fixing). 
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a.  General Characteristics 
Some state antitrust statutes, such as that of Massachusetts,89 mirror the 
language of the Sherman Act, while others, like New York,90 track only 
specific provisions while providing more expanded or limited protections in 
various areas.  State governments may seek federal relief under the 
Sherman Act, and state law may also identify and regulate business 
practices with a “substantial local impact.”91
State enforcers may rely on state antitrust statutes even when such 
statutes differ from federal law or those of other states.
 
92  State attorneys 
general may pursue proprietary claims on behalf of state entities, represent 
consumers under state or federal law, and represent the public interest.93  
Generally, “state antitrust law may be enforced even though it prohibits 
less, the same, or more than federal antitrust law” if it does not place an 
undue burden on interstate commerce, is not one of a set of isolated 
exemptions from federal law, and does not mandate anticompetitive 
results.94
b.  Supplemental Prohibitions in State Antitrust Legislation 
 
Individual states have the “right to make enforcement decisions that 
differ from those of other state and federal enforcers.”95  In the case of 
resale price maintenance, seventeen states have statutes explicitly 
prohibiting the practice as of April 2011.96  For example, courts in 
California have consistently held that resale price maintenance is unlawful 
because resale price maintenance schemes “destroy[] horizontal 
competition as effectively as would a horizontal agreement among 
distributors or retailers.”97
3.  Standards of Analysis:  Per Se and Rule of Reason 
 
Courts determine whether a business practice violates antitrust law by 
either finding that the conduct falls into a per se category, or by utilizing 
rule of reason analysis.  Conduct that clearly meets the characterization of 
section 1,98 such as group boycotts99 and tying contracts,100
 
 89. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93, § 4 (2010). 
 is per se 
 90. Donnelly Act, N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 340 (McKinney 2009). 
 91. AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 48, at 58. 
 92. See ABA SEC. ANTITRUST L., supra note 35, at 2. 
 93. See id. at 3. 
 94. AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 48, at 59–60. 
 95. ABA SEC. ANTITRUST L.,  supra note 35, at 2. 
 96. States with broad price fixing prohibitions as of April 2011 are:  California, 
Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Maryland, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, 
Nevada, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, South Carolina, Tennessee, and West Virginia. See 
Lindsay, supra note 51. 
 97. Kunert v. Mission Fin. Servs. Corp., 110 Cal. App. 4th 242, 263 (2003); accord 
Maitland v. Burckle, 572 P.2d 1142, 1147 (Cal. 1978). 
 98. Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits any agreement which unreasonably restrains 
competition and which affects interstate commerce. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). 
2012] ANTITRUST REGULATION OF IMAP POLICIES 1691 
illegal.101  This type of conduct has a “pernicious effect on competition and 
lack of any redeeming virtue” and thus merits no further inquiry.102  
Because such conduct “would always or almost always tend to restrict 
competition and decrease output,”103 a plaintiff need only allege conduct 
that falls into a per se category, and prove that the impermissible conduct in 
fact occurred.104
Analysis under the rule of reason requires further inquiry.  Established in 
Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, the rule states that the 
Sherman Act “should be construed in the light of reason; and, as so 
construed, it prohibits all contracts and combination which amount to an 
unreasonable or undue restraint of trade in interstate commerce.”
 
105  Rule 
of reason analysis looks at the totality of the circumstances, analyzing facts 
peculiar to the business, the history of the restraint, and the reasons why it 
was imposed106 in order to evaluate the impact the contested behavior has 
on competition in a relevant market.107  Additionally, the intent and 
motivations of the parties are relevant to a court’s rule of reason inquiry, 
but not necessarily outcome-determinative.108  According to the Supreme 
Court in National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States,109 
“the purpose of the analysis is to form a judgment about the competitive 
significance of the restraint.”110  As originally outlined by the Court in 
Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, the rule of reason inquiry 
encompasses a broad range of factors,111 but courts have attempted to apply 
more specific criteria for analyzing particular business practices.112
 
 99. Group boycotts, also known as concerted refusals to deal, are agreements between or 
among multiple competitors to refuse to do business with another competitor, another class 
of competitors, or particular individual or groups of suppliers or customers. BRODER, supra 
note 
  For 
5, at 49. 
 100. A tying contract or tying agreement occurs when a seller conditions the sale of a 
desirable product on the purchase of a less desirable product. Id. at 50. 
 101. See id. at 272 (“The Supreme Court has decreed that certain agreements (including 
agreements involving horizontal and some vertical price-fixing, restrictions on output, bid-
rigging, tying, market or customer allocations, and group boycotts) are per se illegal.”); see 
also POSNER, supra note 50, at 36. 
 102. N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). 
 103. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 19–20 (1979). 
 104. See ABA SEC. ANTITRUST L., supra note 73, at 3. 
 105. Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 1 (1911). 
 106. See Cont’l T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 n.15 (1977). 
 107. See SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 6, at 61. 
 108. See ABA SEC. ANTITRUST L., supra note 73, at 114–15. 
 109. 435 U.S. 679 (1978). 
 110. Id. at 691–92. 
 111. Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) (discussing factors 
in a rule of reason analysis).  The breadth of Justice Brandeis’s description of the rule of 
reason inquiry in Chicago Board of Trade has been the subject of significant criticism. See 
Thomas C. Arthur, Farewell to the Sea of Doubt:  Jettisoning the Constitutional Sherman 
Act, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 263, 303–04 (1986). 
 112. See, e.g., Cont’l T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 54–58 (1977) (stating 
that in analyzing territorial restraints, courts should compare the increased interbrand 
competition encouraged by additional point-of-sale services with the potential corresponding 
reduction in intrabrand competition). 
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example, lower courts have supplied a more concrete structure113 in order 
to determine “whether the anticompetitive effects of [a] restraint are 
outweighed by the procompetitive benefits for which the challenged 
restraint is reasonably necessary.”114
Over time, courts have limited the number and scope of business 
practices meriting per se prohibition in favor of a broader application of the 
rule of reason.
 
115  Currently, the rule of reason is the “prevailing standard of 
[section 1] analysis.”116  The manner in which the rule of reason is applied 
can vary significantly, however, and the rule of reason has been subject to a 
great deal of criticism for its vagueness.117  Although it purports to provide 
a complete, detailed analysis, some have called the rule of reason 
“dangerously open-ended.”118  Others assert that rule of reason analysis 
“has no substantive content.”119  Additionally, the breadth of a rule of 
reason inquiry can result in ceaseless discovery and consequent enormous 
increases in litigation costs.120
Scholars also argue that conduct subject to the rule of reason becomes de 
facto permissible in practice and that the conduct is nearly always allowed 
to continue when adjudicated, particularly by juries.
 
121  Because the 
standard is so uncertain and courts are willing to give businesses the benefit 
of the doubt, alleged anticompetitive conduct that does not fall into a per se 
category is rarely found to violate section 1 of the Sherman Act.122  
Manufacturers insist, however, that modern applications of rule of reason 
analysis are far from permissive, citing the Court’s recent Leegin 
decision.123
 
 113. 1 ABA SEC. ANTITRUST L., ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 53 (4th ed. 1997) 
(“[U]nder the traditional rule of reason, the plaintiff bears the initial burden of proving that 
an agreement has had or is likely to have a substantially adverse effect on competition.  If the 
plaintiff meets its initial burden, the burden shifts to the defendant to demonstrate the 
procompetitive virtues of the alleged wrongful conduct.  If the defendant does demonstrate 
procompetitive virtues, then the plaintiff must show that the challenged conduct is not 
reasonably necessary to achieve the stated objective.”). 
 
 114. ABA SEC. ANTITRUST L., supra note 73, at 133. 
 115. Id. at 2. 
 116. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 49. 
 117. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 12 (1984) 
(“When everything is relevant, nothing is dispositive.”). 
 118. Jesse W. Markham, Jr., Sailing a Sea of Doubt:  A Critique of the Rule of Reason in 
U.S. Antitrust Law, 17 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. (forthcoming), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1916223. 
 119. Piraino, supra note 45, at 1754. 
 120. See Alan M. Barr, State Challenges to Vertical Price Fixing in the Post-Leegin 
World 2, Testimony Before the FTC, Hearings on Resale Price Maintenance (May 21, 2009) 
(“In the absence of the per se rule, proof becomes more complex and already expensive 
litigation becomes even more expensive.”); Frank H. Easterbrook, Vertical Arrangements 
and the Rule of Reason, 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 135, 155 (1984). 
 121. See, e.g., Daniel A. Crane, Rules Versus Standards in Antitrust Adjudication, 64 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 49, 64, 92–94 (2007); Richard A. Posner, The Rule of Reason and the 
Economic Approach:  Reflections on the Sylvania Decision, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 14 (1977) 
(describing the rule of reason as “little more than a euphemism for nonliability”). 
 122. See Crane, supra note 121, at 64. 
 123. See, e.g., Retail Price Maintenance Polices:  A Bane for Retailers, but a Boon for 
Consumers?, KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON (Aug. 8, 2007), http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.
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C.  Manufacturer-Imposed Pricing and Advertising Requirements 
Judicial opinions on resale price maintenance and other manufacturer-
imposed requirements have varied since the enactment of antitrust 
legislation.  In fact, “[f]ew areas of antitrust law have provoked more 
reconsideration of established rules, or more disagreement between courts 
and commentators, than vertical price and nonprice restraints.”124
1.  Resale Price Maintenance 
  This 
section defines resale price maintenance, as well as several other techniques 
used by manufacturers to control the resale advertisement and pricing of 
their products. 
Resale price maintenance, also known as vertical price fixing or vertical 
price maintenance, occurs when a manufacturer and its distributors agree to 
sell at certain prices.125  When the agreed price is a price floor below which 
a product cannot be sold, this is called minimum resale price 
maintenance.126  Generally, a manufacturer imposes restraints by “express 
promises, threats or other mechanisms, with the goal of 
controlling . . . price.”127  RPM is an “intrabrand” restraint because it 
regulates a retailer’s sales of a single brand without limiting sales of brands 
made by other suppliers.128
Resale price maintenance became increasingly popular in the United 
States in the late 1800s, when the growth of the fields of advertising and 
branding led to increased product differentiation.
 
129  The establishment of 
RPM allowed manufacturers greater control over the efficient distribution 
and sale of their products.130  Manufacturers often, and reasonably, wish to 
control their products’ resale prices.131
In a competitive market, intrabrand competition occurs when retailers 





edu/article.cfm?articleid=1789 [hereinafter Retail Price Maintenance Policies] (statement of 
deputy legal counsel for the National Association of Manufacturers). 
  The imposition of resale price maintenance or another 
non-price vertical restraint by a manufacturer has the potential to limit this 
 124. HOVENKAMP, supra note 18, at 447. See generally Barak Y. Orbach, RPM 
Landmarks, BARAK ORBACH, http://www.orbach.org/RPM/index.html (last visited Feb. 23, 
2012) (listing landmark Supreme Court cases and their impact on the per se illegality or 
permissibility of resale price maintenance since Fowle v. Parke, 131 U.S. 88 (1889)). 
 125. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 18, at 447 (defining RPM as the “manufacturer or 
supplier regulation of the price at which a product is resold by independent dealers”). 
 126. See BRODER, supra note 5, at 55. 
 127. 2 JOSEPH P. BAUER & WILLIAM H. PAGE, KINTNER:  FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW § 12.2, 
at 178 (2002). 
 128. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 18, at 447. 
 129. See Barak Y. Orbach, Antitrust Vertical Myopia:  The Allure of High Prices, 50 
ARIZ. L. REV. 261, 262 (2008). 
 130. See BORK, supra note 44, at 289 (“When a manufacturer wishes to impose resale 
price maintenance . . . his motive . . . can only be the creation of distributive efficiency.”). 
 131. See BRODER, supra note 5, at 56. 
 132. See id. at 57. 
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type of competition.133  On the other hand, price maintenance policies have 
the concomitant effect of promoting interbrand competition—competition 
among manufacturers.134  Additionally, higher prices can be indicative of 
product quality or desirability.135  A reputation of discounting can be 
damaging to a product, brand, or manufacturer’s reputation.136  Strong 
relationships with dealers also provide incentives for imposing RPM:  
dealers can be encouraged to provide additional services to consumers, 
including trained sales personnel, showrooms, and advertising.137  Absent 
an RPM policy and the correspondingly higher resale prices, dealers could 
be less likely to provide these types of services to consumers.138  
Discounters argue that these policies exist merely to protect existing 
distribution strategies or to maintain a product’s “snob appeal.”139
2.  Additional Manufacturer-Imposed Resale Restrictions 
 
It is important to note that Manufacturer’s Suggested Retail Prices 
(MSRPs), list prices, and Recommended Retail Prices (RRPs) imposed by 
manufacturers or distributors are distinguishable from RPM.  In the case of 
an MSRP, the manufacturer suggests or recommends a price for its retailers 
but does not require that their product be sold at that price.140  According to 
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), as long as the dealer comes to the 
pricing decision on its own, it may price at the MSRP or any other price.141  
Additionally, a manufacturer may permissibly choose not to use distributors 
that do not adhere to their MSRP.142
Manufacturers also impose indirect pricing requirements via Minimum 
Advertised Price (MAP) policies or the offer of a cooperative advertising 
program.
 
143  MAP policies set a price floor below which dealers cannot 
advertise.144  A cooperative advertising program is an initiative in which a 
supplier offers a subsidy or service to distributors and resellers in order to 
advertise a product.145
 
 133. See id. 
  Often, these programs are conditioned on the 
reseller’s compliance with a MAP policy.  Should the reseller sell the 
 134. See id. 
 135. See generally William F. Baxter, Vertical Prices—Half Slave, Half Free, 52 
ANTITRUST L.J. 743 (1983) (discussing how restricted dealing, like advertising, permits 
retailers to lend their reputation to manufacturers); see also Orbach, supra note 129, at 278 
(arguing that for premium brands, high prices are a component of a product’s allure). 
 136. See 2 BAUER & PAGE, supra note 127, § 12.2, at 180. 
 137. See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 120, at 147–48. 
 138. See 2 BAUER & PAGE, supra note 127, § 12.2, at 180. 
 139. See Robert A. Pollak, Price Dependent Preferences, 67 AM. ECON. REV. 64, 64 
(1977); Symposium, Foreword:  Antitrust and the Discounters’ Case Against Resale Price 
Maintenance, 14 ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REV. 1, 3 (1982). 
 140. See An FTC Guide to Dealings in the Supply Chain, supra note 3, at 2. 
 141. See id. at 1. 
 142. See id. at 2. 
 143. See ABA SEC. ANTITRUST L., ANTITRUST HANDBOOK FOR FRANCHISE AND 
DISTRIBUTION PRACTITIONERS 62–64 (2008). 
 144. See BRODER, supra note 5, at 56. 
 145. See ABA SEC. ANTITRUST L., ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 144 (6th ed. 2007). 
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product at a price below that required by the manufacturer, the 
manufacturer may terminate the program or choose not to continue with 
distribution.146  Manufacturers are given “considerable leeway” in setting 
terms for cooperative advertising, but in some cases, courts have held these 
agreements to be anticompetitive.147  The Fifth Circuit upheld a cooperative 
advertising program in In Re Nissan Antitrust Litigation148 because the 
evidence indicated that dealers who participated in the program could sell 
cars “at whatever price they chose.”149  Generally, cooperative advertising 
programs are permissible, subject to rule of reason analysis, so long as a 
dealer is “free to decline to participate in the program and advertise and 
charge its own price.”150  Under federal antitrust law, distinguishing 
between advertised and retail pricing is no longer necessarily outcome-
determinative.151
Rather than restrict dealer pricing, manufacturers may also incentivize 
behavior via promotional allowance.
 
152  Promotional allowances 
compensate retailers for providing particular consumer services, shifting the 
cost of services from the consumer to the manufacturer.153
3.  Internet Minimum Advertised Price Policies 
  While they are 
not classified as a manufacturer-imposed restriction, promotional 
allowances are an alternative means of balancing product price with 
essential consumer services. 
IMAP policies are advertising price restrictions imposed by 
manufacturers on online retailers and traditional retailers that that sell 
products online.154
 
 146. See, e.g., SonicWall MAP Policy, SONICWALL, http://www.sonicwall.com/us/
partners/4697.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2012). 
  These policies aim to regulate internet-based 
 147. See An FTC Guide to Dealings in the Supply Chain, supra note 3, at 3; see also M. 
Courtney McCormick, Note, The Recording Industry, Minimum Advertised Pricing Polices 
and Non-price Vertical Restraints of Trade, 4 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 220, 229 (2002) 
(discussing consent agreements between five record companies and the FTC mandating 
stringent restrictions on advertising restraints). 
 148. 577 F.2d 910 (5th Cir. 1978). 
 149. Id. at 915. 
 150. Statement of Policy Regarding Price Restrictions in Cooperative Advertising 
Programs—Rescission, 6 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 39,057, at 41,638 (May 21, 1987) (“The 
Commission now concludes that price restrictions in cooperative advertising programs, 
standing alone, are not per se unlawful.”); see also Magnavox Co., 113 F.T.C. 255 (1990) 
(amending consent order to permit price restrictions in cooperative advertising programs 
because such restrictions are not per se unlawful and because, absent further pricing 
agreements, restriction of interbrand competition or reduced output is unlikely). 
 151. See ABA SEC. ANTITRUST L., supra note 143, at 64. 
 152. See Warren S. Grimes, Brand Marketing, Intrabrand Competition, and the 
Multibrand Retailer:  The Antitrust Law of Vertical Restraints, 64 ANTITRUST L.J. 83, 101 
(1995). 
 153. See generally Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. FTC, 221 F.3d 928 (7th Cir. 2000) (describing 
promotional allowance program where Toys “R” Us received separate compensation from 
toy manufacturers for providing retailer services); Robert L. Steiner, Manufacturers’ 
Promotional Allowances, Free Riders and Vertical Restraints, 36 ANTITRUST BULL. 383 
(1991) (discussing promotional allowances). 
 154. See Rosch Remarks, supra note 1, at 22–23. 
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advertising of a manufacturer’s products.155  As with traditional MAP 
policies, failure to comply with IMAP policies can result in loss of 
incentives, temporary reductions in order fulfillment, and permanent 
termination of future dealership contracts.156  Specific policy language can 
vary, and IMAP policies can be directed at products sold by internet-only 
vendors (such as Amazon.com and smaller websites like Homecenter.com); 
brick-and-mortar stores with online retail capacity (like Walmart or Best 
Buy); and, less frequently, to product manufacturers (including Apple and 
Quoizel).157
IMAP policies fall in a gray area between typical RPM and non-price 
advertising restrictions.  In order to merit analysis under section 1 of the 
Sherman Act and related state antitrust statutes, a contested policy must be 
the result of an agreement between multiple parties.
  This section discusses how IMAP policies relate to 
manufacturers’ traditional methods of price, advertising, and resale 
restrictions. 
158  In order to avoid 
classification as an agreement, many IMAP policies contain specific, 
detailed language asserting that the policy’s development and imposition 
are purely unilateral.159  Even in instances where distributors or dealers 
must agree, sign, or consent to new policies, these contracts frequently 
include confusing clauses stating that “nothing in this agreement shall 
constitute an agreement.”160  Despite such provisions touting unilateral 
conduct, IMAP policies are allegedly designed to support existing 
distribution models and, by definition, only regulate a certain type of 
vendor—those on the internet.161  Instances where an IMAP policy 
primarily benefits or harms one defined sector can provide evidence of 
indirect agreement; thus, questions of agreement arise when brick-and-
mortar stores encourage or support the imposition of an IMAP policy.162
 
 155. See id. at *11. 
 
 156. See, e.g., Riado Internet Minimum Advertised Price Policy, supra note 2, ¶ 2 (“If a 
customer violates this IMAP policy, Riado will request the customer to cease advertising or 
promoting products on the Internet in violation of its IMAP policy.  In addition, Riado will 
cease to accept from and/or ship orders for said customer.”). 
 157. See Rosch Remarks, supra note 1, at 22–23. 
 158. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). 
 159. See, e.g., Riado Internet Minimum Advertised Price Policy, supra note 2, ¶ 3 (“In 
executing this policy, Riado will act at all times unilaterally, and will neither solicit, consider 
nor agree to any recommendation, request or demand of any other person.  All matters of 
interpretation and application of the terms of this policy and all matters concerning 
enforcement of this policy shall remain with the sole, unilateral authority of Riado.”). 
 160. See, e.g., Quoizel Internet Minimum Advertised Price Policy 1 (Jan. 1, 2008) (on file 
with the Fordham Law Review) (“Quoizel does not ask for, nor will it accept any assurance 
of compliance or agreement . . . .  Notwithstanding anything to the contrary which may be 
expressed or implied in or by one or more agreements between a Dealer or Customer and 
Quoizel, nothing in those agreements shall constitute an agreement . . . to comply with 
IMAP.  Honoring IMAP by selling at or above the IMAP price is not communicating 
acceptance or compliance.”). 
 161. Affidavit of Brian Okin, Worldhomecenter.com CEO ¶ 9, Worldhomecenter.com, 
Inc. v. Quoizel, Inc., No. 651444/2010 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2011). 
 162. Absent an agreement or other direct evidence, courts look at several factors when a 
lack of direct evidence requires using circumstantial evidence based on defendants’ conduct 
to plausibly prove a conspiracy including proof of conscious parallelism, sharing of prices, 
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IMAP policies differ from cooperative advertising programs because 
manufacturers do not necessarily offer assistance in generating, producing 
and disseminating advertisements.163
D.  Resale Price Maintenance in Public Policy, Legislation, and the Courts 
  IMAP policies simply restrict how 
internet vendors may publicize their own pricing online. 
This section addresses the historical treatment of resale price 
maintenance in the courts, in scholarship, and in state and federal 
legislation.  Next, it discusses the various anticompetitive effects and 
procompetitive rationales for establishing RPM that have served to inform 
judicial decision and classification as either per se illegal or subject to the 
rule of reason.  Finally, this section describes the facts and holding of the 
Supreme Court’s most recent RPM case, Leegin Creative Leather Products, 
Inc. v. PSKS, Inc.164
1.  Historical Treatment of RPM 
 
Under the common law, agreements in restraint of trade were 
unenforceable, if not affirmatively illegal.165  In the early twentieth century, 
resale price maintenance agreements were generally enforceable except 
where a supplier possessed a large market share,166 or where RPM was used 
to facilitate horizontal price fixing.167
Resale price maintenance was first definitively evaluated by the Supreme 
Court in Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co. and deemed to 
be per se illegal.
 
168  In this case, Dr. Miles Medical Company, a 
manufacturer of patented medicines, required retail drugstores to sign a 
contract ordering that the Dr. Miles products be sold only at manufacturer-
imposed prices.169  The Court held that this and other RPM agreements, 
“having for their sole purpose the destruction of competition and the fixing 
of prices,” were “injurious to the public interest and void.”170
Even though state court anti-price-fixing principles guided the Court in 
Dr. Miles, states shifted their perspectives and began to permit price fixing 
under their own antitrust statutes.
  As such, 
RPM was categorized as per se illegal. 
171
 
pretextual explanations, and market structure. See ABA SEC. ANTITRUST L., supra note 
  In the early 1930s, the United States 
was in the midst of the Great Depression and antitrust enforcement reached 
74, at 
63–86. 
 163. See An FTC Guide to Dealings in the Supply Chain, supra note 3, at 3. 
 164. 551 U.S. 877 (2007). 
 165. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 18, at 472. 
 166. See generally Grogan v. Chaffee, 105 P. 745 (Cal. 1909). 
 167. See John D. Park & Sons Co. v. Hartman, 153 F. 24, 42 (6th Cir. 1907). 
 168. 220 U.S. 373 (1911). 
 169. See id. at 394. 
 170. Id. at 408. 
 171. The per se rule against price fixing was based to some degree on state court 
principles in evaluating state antitrust laws. See, e.g., United States v. Trenton Potteries, Co., 
273 U.S. 392, 400 (1927) (holding price fixing to be illegal per se, in reliance on earlier state 
case law). 
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its nadir.172  In reaction to the economic turmoil and its impact on business 
operations, many states developed and passed fair trade legislation that 
permitted resale price maintenance.173
As the Sherman Act was interpreted more and more broadly, Congress 
sought to avoid conflict with the will of the states to permit producers to set 
retail prices.
 
174  For this reason, Congress passed the Miller-Tydings Fair 
Trade Act175 in 1937, carving out an exception to the Sherman Act to 
permit state acceptance of RPM.  Miller-Tydings remained in effect176 until 
it was repealed by the Consumer Goods Pricing Act of 1975.177  After 
World War II, resale price maintenance became unpopular; although thirty-
six states explicitly permitted RPM by 1975, a Department of Justice (DOJ) 
official informed Congress that customers in states that allowed RPM faced 
19 to 27 percent higher prices than those in states that proscribed it.178  
Additionally, the Supreme Court in 1968 extended per se analysis to 
maximum resale price maintenance in Albrecht v. Herald Company.179
The Consumer Goods Pricing Act restricted the form of lawful price 
maintenance agreements to suggested list prices, resulting in “essentially no 
restriction since suggested list prices [can]not be legally enforced.”
 
180  
Although the enactment of the Consumer Goods Pricing Act in 1975 
ostensibly sent RPM back into disfavor, the Antitrust Division of the DOJ 
was “reluctant to enforce the per se rule.”181  This reluctance was based on 
a belief that RPM could have procompetitive justifications that would merit 
rule of reason, not per se, analysis.182  Nevertheless, the Court continued to 
extend and reinforce the pre-existing rule of per se illegality.183
 
 172. SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 
  As per se 
6, at 7 (“[A]ntitrust enforcement was tepid, perhaps 
reaching a low point during the first years of the Great Depression.”). 
 173. See Note, supra note 15, at 1603. 
 174. See SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 6, at 318. 
 175. Pub. L. No. 314, 50 Stat. 693 (1937) (repealed 1975). 
 176. The McGuire Act of 1952 expanded Miller-Tydings by permitting states to enact fair 
trade laws that made minimum price agreements enforceable, even against nonsigners—non-
party sellers in the distribution chain with notice of a fixed price. 66 Stat. 631 (1952), 
repealed by Consumer Goods Pricing Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-145, 89 Stat. 801 (1975); 
see also SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 6, at 318. 
 177. Consumer Goods Pricing Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-145, 89 Stat. 801 (1975).  The 
Consumer Goods Pricing Act also repealed the McGuire Act. Id. 
 178. Fair Trade:  Hearing on H.R. 2384 Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust & Monopoly 
of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 1, 122 (1975) (statement of Keith I. 
Clearwaters, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust Div.). 
 179. 390 U.S. 145 (1968) (extending the per se rule against minimum resale price 
maintenance to maximum resale price maintenance). 
 180. Retail Price Maintenance Policies, supra note 123. 
 181. Note, supra note 15, at 1603. 
 182. See, e.g., Anthony J. Greco, The Resale Price Maintenance Struggle:  Its Legislative 
Updating, 51 AM. J. ECON. & SOC. 173, 175 (1992). 
 183. See Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984) (reaffirming per 
se illegality of RPM); Rice v. Norman Williams, 458 U.S. 654 (1982) (same); Cal. Retail 
Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980) (same); Cont’l T. V., 
Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977) (overruling United States v. Arnold, Schwinn 
& Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967), by holding non-vertical price restraints to the rule of reason, but 
reaffirming the existing per se prohibition of RPM); Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 
(1968) (holding that maximum RPM is per se illegal, as are other kinds of RPM). 
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illegal conduct, an RPM plaintiff was required only to prove “(1) that the 
arrangement at issue includes a sale and a resale, and is not merely a 
consignment; (2) that there is a qualifying agreement between two or more 
distinct firms; and (3) that the agreement is a qualifying agreement on price 
or price levels.”184  After Dr. Miles, courts generally assumed that the 
subsequent economic effects of minimum RPM were analogous to those 
created by horizontal price fixing by a cartel.185  Over time, though, experts 
and courts offered procompetitive justifications for RPM.186  When the 
Supreme Court most recently addressed the issue of resale price 
maintenance, it was in the context of growing scholarship detailing possible 
procompetitive justifications for imposing these policies on retailers.187
2.  Divergent Viewpoints on RPM 
 
a.  Anticompetitive Effects 
Courts have historically held RPM policies to be in restraint of trade, and 
as such, have frequently cited the numerous potential anticompetitive 
effects of establishing these policies.188  The primary argument against 
minimum vertical price agreements is that they lead to “higher, and usually 
uniform, resale prices.”189  Some have argued that these agreements 
“completely eliminate price flexibility at the dealer level and may stabilize 
higher prices at the manufacturer level.”190
Additionally, courts and policymakers are concerned that resale price 
maintenance facilitates manufacturer and retailer cartels.
 
191  Cartels are a 
group of aligned competitors who explicitly agree in order to attain 
supracompetitive pricing.192
 
 184. HOVENKAMP, supra note 
  According to the Leegin Court, RPM can 
18, at 481 (citing Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 
485 U.S. 717, 735 (1988)). 
 185. See BORK, supra note 44, at 33 (discussing how the Dr. Miles opinion “equated 
horizontal cartel behavior with vertical price fixing,” rendering vertical price fixing per se 
illegal); see also Dr. Miles Med. Co v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 407–08 
(1911). 
 186. See generally BORK, supra note 44, at 280–91 (discussing procompetitive 
justifications for RPM); POSNER, supra note 50, at 172–73 (addressing motives for imposing 
RPM); infra Part I.D.2.b. 
 187. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 900 (2007) 
(“[R]espected authorities in the economics literature suggest the per se rule is inappropriate, 
and there is now widespread agreement that resale price maintenance can have 
procompetitive effects.”). 
 188. See, e.g., Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n, 445 U.S. at 102 (affirming adherence to 
a per se approach to RPM); GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 51 n.18 (stating that the court’s 
holding was intended to preserve the pre-existing per se rule against RPM). 
 189. Robert Pitofsky, In Defense of Discounters:  The No-Frills Case for a Per Se Rule 
Against Vertical Price Fixing, 71 GEO. L.J. 1487, 1488 (1983). See generally Fair Trade:  
Hearing on H.R. 2384, supra note 178 (discussing study on prices of consumer goods in fair 
trade and non fair trade states). 
 190. See, e.g., Pitofsky, supra note 189, at 1488. 
 191. See, e.g., Leegin, 551 U.S. at 892–93 (2007) (discussing the potential for cartel 
development). 
 192. See SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 6, at 40. 
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facilitate manufacturer cartels “in identifying price-cutting manufacturers 
who benefit from the lower prices they offer.”193
A group of retailers might collude to fix prices to consumers and then 
compel a manufacturer to aid the unlawful arrangement with resale price 
maintenance.  In that instance the manufacturer does not establish the 
practice to stimulate services or to promote its brand but to give 
inefficient retailers higher profits.  Retailers with better distribution 
systems and lower cost structures would be prevented from charging 
lower prices by the agreement.
  In addition to facilitating 
manufacturer cartels, RPM also may be used to organize retailer cartels.  As 
stated in Leegin, 
194
One of the Leegin Court’s primary concerns about RPM was the potential 
for abuse by a powerful manufacturer or retailer.
 
195  Justice Anthony 
Kennedy stated that “[a] dominant retailer, for example, might request 
[RPM] to forestall innovation. . . .  A manufacturer might consider it has 
little choice but to accommodate the retailer’s demands for vertical price 
restraints if the manufacturer believes it needs access to the retailer’s 
distribution network.”196  When an entire industry engages in price fixing, 
the Court has held that establishing RPM agreements would reduce both 
interbrand and intrabrand competition because doing so prevents any price 
competition at the retail level.197
Finally, RPM can interfere with consumer choice by “authorizing the 
manufacturer to decide what mix of products and services is desirable.”
 
198  
Unrestricted pricing offers consumers more options:  they can choose 
among cheaper brands with fewer services, more expensive brands with 
broad services, or something in between.199
b.  Procompetitive Justifications 
 
Under the rule of reason, these anticompetitive concerns are weighed 
against the potential for procompetitive justifications for imposing RPM 
 
 193. Leegin, 551 U.S. at 892; see also Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 
717, 725 (1988).  For more information, see generally Posner, supra note 121; Thomas R. 
Overstreet, Jr., Resale Price Maintenance:  Economic Theories and Empirical Evidence, 
Bureau of Economics Staff Report to the FTC (Nov. 1983). 
 194. Leegin, 551 U.S. at 893; accord Howard P. Marvel & Stephen McCafferty, The 
Welfare Effects of Resale Price Maintenance, 28 J.L. & ECON. 363, 373 (1985). 
 195. See Leegin, 551 U.S. at 893. 
 196. Id. at 893–94; see also Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. FTC, 221 F.3d 928, 937–38 (7th Cir. 
2000) (discussing how a system of vertical arrangements between retailers and toy 
manufacturers required parties to comply or risk losing access to a distribution network). 
 197. See 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335, 342 (1987) (“Mandatory industrywide 
resale price fixing is virtually certain to reduce interbrand competition as well as intrabrand 
competition, because it prevents manufacturers and wholesalers from allowing or requiring 
retail price competition.”). 
 198. Pitofsky, supra note 189, at 1493. 
 199. See Lao, supra note 15, at 19 (noting that consumers “can shop in the manner that 
suits them”). 
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policies.200  The main business rationale for imposing resale price 
maintenance is similar to that for other vertical restraints:  the stimulation of 
interbrand competition by reducing intrabrand competition among 
retailers.201  For example, if the manufacturers of different brands of 
ibuprofen painkillers engage in RPM, retailers charge the prices set by the 
manufacturers.  Then, the activities of the manufacturers themselves 
(Advil’s marketing or a generic brand’s strategic decision to price lower) 
would allow consumers to choose.202
This leads to several potential benefits.  First, RPM that eliminates 
intrabrand price competition encourages retailer investment in tangible or 
intangible services or promotions “that aid the manufacturer’s position as 
against rival manufacturers.”
 
203  Second, RPM is also justifiable because it 
can “facilitat[e] market entry for new firms and brands.”204
One of the most frequently invoked rationales for imposing RPM, 
particularly on the internet, is the prevention of “free riding.”
  With a 
comprehensive price maintenance scheme, a new firm or brand is 
guaranteed a profit margin, and can utilize that buffer in order to cover 
initial start-up costs. 
205  Some 
argue that without RPM, retailers would be less likely to provide valuable 
consumer services that enhance interbrand competition because discounters 
can “free ride” on the retailers who do provide services.206  Internet retailers 
have low overhead costs and lack a physical shopping environment where 
consumers can interact with products and staff.  For these reasons, online 
retailers are often characterized as free riders.207
 
 200. ABA SEC. ANTITRUST L., supra note 73, at 116 (“If the plaintiff has shown a 
substantial anticompetitive effect, the defendant must come forward with some justification 
for the restraint.”). 
  Supporters of RPM claim 
that minimum resale pricing prevents discounters from undercutting a 
retailer that provides services, including showrooms, product 
 201. RPM can stimulate competition among manufacturers of different brands of the 
same product, which would consequently reduce intrabrand competition among retailers 
selling the same brand. See Leegin, 551 U.S. at 878.  When a retailer need not worry about 
competing with others for a certain brand, competition occurs on the manufacturer level 
instead. See id. at 890. 
 202. See Easterbrook, supra note 120, at 148–49 (discussing how restricted dealing can 
play a role in expanding consumer choice). 
 203. Leegin, 551 U.S. at 890. 
 204. Id.; see also Cont’l T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 55 (1977); Marvel 
& McCafferty, supra note 194, at 369 (stating that reliance on retailer reputation declines as 
a brand becomes better known and that RPM may be a competitive device for new entrants). 
 205. See GTE Sylvania, 443 U.S. at 55 (discussing the prevention of free riding as a 
justification to adopt the rule of reason for vertical non-price restraints). 
 206. See generally Easterbrook, supra note 120; Lester Telser, Why Should 
Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?, 3 J.L. & ECON. 86, 91 (1960) (describing the free rider 
effect). 
 207. See Lao, supra note 15, at 16; POSNER, supra note 50, at 172–73 (describing an 
example of the free rider problem where consumers might learn about a product at a 
demonstration provided by a retailer, and then ultimately purchase from a discount seller). 
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demonstrations, warranties, and customer assistance in selecting and 
maintaining a product.208
Some take the argument even further, stating that even the rule of reason 
is not sufficiently permissive and that all vertical price restraints should be 
per se legal.
 
209  For these advocates, price fixing and other forms of 
restricted dealing are simply an additional and effective means of 
competition.210  For example, in the case of luxury brands, discounting can 
“harm the appeal of brands and adversely affect sales.”211  Thus, 
prohibiting a manufacturer from setting prices would remove a permissible 
and competitive tool from its arsenal.212
3.  The Supreme Court’s Leegin Decision 
 
The Supreme Court recently addressed the issue of RPM in Leegin 
Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc.213  This 2007 decision held 
RPM to be subject to rule of reason analysis, and no longer per se illegal in 
light of growing scholarship emphasizing the potential positive, 
procompetitive business justifications for imposing RPM.214  In Leegin, the 
plaintiff, a manufacturer of leather goods, sold belts to PSKS for resale at 
its store, Kay’s Kloset.215  After years of successful distribution, Leegin 
imposed a “Retail Pricing and Promotion Policy” that set minimum resale 
prices.216  Kay’s Kloset did not comply, and Leegin terminated the 
distribution relationship.217
In its Leegin opinion, the Supreme Court weighed the procompetitive 
rationales and anticompetitive objections to resale price maintenance, and 
determined that because there may be a concrete set of valid business 
reasons to impose RPM, the practice could not be per se invalid.
 
218  In his 
majority opinion, however, Justice Kennedy emphasized that “[a]s should 
be evident, the potential anticompetitive consequences of vertical price 
restraints must not be ignored or underestimated.”219
 
 208. See Easterbrook, supra note 
  Justice Kennedy also 
120, at 148; cf. Marina Lao, Free Riding:  An 
Overstated, and Unconvincing, Explanation for Resale Price Maintenance, in HOW THE 
CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT THE MARK 196, 202–03 (Robert Pitofsky ed., 2008). See 
generally Telser, supra note 206.  
 209. See Easterbrook, supra note 120, at 135 (“No practice a manufacturer uses to 
distribute its products should be a subject of serious antitrust attention.”). See generally 
Orbach, supra note 129. 
 210. Easterbrook, supra note 120, at 140. 
 211. Orbach, supra note 129, at 261, 278 (discussing how high prices can aid sales and 
influence how consumers perceive quality for luxury brands and premium products). 
 212. See Easterbrook, supra note 120, at 140–53 (discussing how restricted dealing is a 
permissible, effective competitive strategy). 
 213. 551 U.S. 877 (2007). 
 214. See id. at 889. 
 215. See id. at 882–83. 
 216. Id. at 883. 
 217. See id. at 884. 
 218. See id. at 900 (“[R]espected authorities in the economics literature suggest the per se 
rule is inappropriate, and there is now widespread agreement that resale price maintenance 
can have procompetitive effects.”). 
 219. Id. at 894. 
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described the potential for a “change in circumstances” that may require 
general reexamination of RPM.220
Leegin’s controversial shift on RPM, from per se illegality to analysis 
under the rule of reason, has created great uncertainty in the antitrust 
world.
 
221  Subsequent to Leegin, all Sherman Act RPM claims—and thus, 
all IMAP policies if so classified—are reviewed under the rule of reason.222  
However, there are concerns about Leegin’s applicability to state antitrust 
statutes,223 and persistent questions about the implementation of the rule of 
reason standard itself.224  Accordingly, courts and antitrust enforcers have 
yet to reach a clear consensus on when and how RPM can be pro- or 
anticompetitive.  Further, there is uncertainty regarding how IMAP policies 
fit into the already complex RPM analytical framework.225
II.  OLD TRICKS, NEW DOG:  STRUGGLES TO APPLY TRADITIONAL RPM 
ANALYSIS TO IMAP POLICIES 
 
As consumers flock to the internet in search of low prices,226 IMAP 
policies have become increasingly prevalent among manufacturers.227  
IMAP policies are currently being examined through the lens of resale price 
maintenance.228  Given the significant uncertainty surrounding RPM in the 
antitrust world after Leegin, the unique characteristics of IMAP policies, 
and the burden of a heightened pleading standard introduced by Bell 
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,229 plaintiffs have numerous barriers to a 
successful IMAP claim.230
In order to bring a valid antitrust claim against an IMAP policy, a 
plaintiff must overcome two challenging analytical hurdles:  first, arguing 





 220. See generally Note, supra note 
 and second, convincing a court that IMAP is equivalent to 
15, at 16, 19–21 (quoting Leegin, 551 U.S. at 919) 
(discussing how the expansion of internet commerce could have so fundamentally changed 
the antitrust environment that the Leegin holding may need to be revisited). 
 221. See Robert L. Hubbard, Protecting Consumers Post-Leegin, 22 ANTITRUST 41, 41 
(2007). 
 222. See ABA SEC. ANTITRUST L., supra note 9. 
 223. See Barr, supra note 120, at 3. 
 224. See Easterbrook, supra note 120, at 153. 
 225. See Barr, supra note 120, at 3. 
 226. See Walter Baker, Mike Marn, & Craig Zawada, Price Smarter on the Net, 79 HARV. 
BUS. REV. 122, 123 (2001) (discussing how online shoppers report that “far and away the 
most important factor motivating them to buy on-line is lower prices”). 
 227. See generally Rosch Remarks, supra note 1. 
 228. See, e.g., Worldhomecenter.com, Inc. v. L.D. Kichler Co., No. 08-CV-020, 2009 
WL 936675 at *4–5 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2009) (discussing IMAP policies in relation to 
vertical price fixing). 
 229. 550 U.S. 544 (2007); see, e.g., Jacobs v. Tempur-Pedic Int’l, Inc., 626 F.3d 1327, 
1332–33, 1340 (11th Cir. 2010) (reading Leegin and Twombly together to require that RPM 
plaintiffs meet the plausibility standard for all elements of a Sherman Act claim). 
 230. See Hubbard, supra note 221, at 41 (“[S]tate enforcers will have more difficulty 
proving the [RPM] violation under federal antitrust law in light of [Leegin].”). 
 231. See generally Kichler, 2009 WL 936675. 
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RPM.232  Courts have been neither quick nor unanimous to assume that 
RPM and IMAP are analogous.233  Moreover, even if a consensus were to 
be reached, much uncertainty remains regarding the legality of RPM in 
light of the Leegin holding.234
Part II.A analyzes the uneven implementation of rule of reason analysis 
of RPM after Leegin.  Next, Part II.B identifies key elements of a successful 
IMAP claim and illustrates how these elements can function as roadblocks 
to challenging manufacturer-imposed IMAP polices.  Finally, Part II.C 
discusses recent attempts to challenge IMAP policies specifically. 
 
A.  Difficulties in Applying Leegin to RPM and Internet Minimum 
Advertised Price Policies 
As a result of the Supreme Court’s rejection of per se illegality for resale 
price maintenance in Leegin, courts have validated RPM policies or 
dismissed lawsuits due to an inability to plead all of the required elements 
for a successful rule of reason claim.235  The Court’s Leegin holding has 
been applied relatively consistently in federal courts.236  The manner in 
which courts conduct rule of reason analysis, and the treatment of RPM 
under state antitrust statutes, however, have been far more disjointed.237
1.  Federal Court Decisions and Proposed Legislation on Resale Price 
Maintenance After Leegin 
  
IMAP policies remain relatively untested, and add an extra layer of 
complexity to an already uncertain area of law. 
Federal courts have been fairly consistent in their post-Leegin holdings 
on RPM, but there is a great deal of resistance to Leegin in academia and 
state enforcement.238
 
 232. See, e.g., Campbell v. Austin Air Sys., Ltd., 423 F. Supp. 2d 61 (W.D.N.Y. 2005). 
  In Toledo Mack Sales & Service, Inc. v. Mack Trucks, 
 233. Compare Worldhomecenter.com, Inc. v. L.D. Kichler Co., No. 05-CV-3297, 2007 
WL 963206, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2007) (stating that a contested IMAP policy had the 
effect of restricting retail prices for internet retailers), with Campbell, 423 F. Supp. 2d 
(holding that the IMAP policy at issue, by definition, restricted only the advertised price and 
had no price-fixing implications). 
 234. See generally Barr, supra note 120; Hubbard, supra note 221, Rosch Remarks, supra 
note 1; infra Part II.A.  
 235. See, e.g., Rick-Mik Enters. v. Equilon Enters., 532 F.3d 963, 975–76 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(holding that plaintiff’s allegation that a gasoline production joint venture conspired with 
banks and others to fix credit card processing fees was merely conclusory and dismissed for 
vagueness pursuant to the Twombly plausibility pleading standard). See generally Spahr v. 
Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc., No. 2:07-CV-187, 2008 WL 3914461 (E.D. Tenn. Aug. 
20, 2008) (holding, similarly, that the alleged RPM scheme was no longer per se illegal in 
light of Leegin). 
 236. See ABA SEC. ANTITRUST L., 2008 ANNUAL REVIEW OF ANTITRUST LAW 
DEVELOPMENTS 23–25 (2009) (summarizing the application of rule of reason analysis in 
federal courts after Leegin). 
 237. See Michael A. Lindsay, An Update on State RPM Laws Since Leegin, ANTITRUST 
SOURCE, Dec. 2010, available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/
antitrust_source/Dec10_Lindsay12_21f.authcheckdam.pdf. 
 238. See Barr, supra note 120, at 2. 
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Inc.,239 the Third Circuit vacated a judgment as a matter of law in favor of 
defendants and held that the plaintiff had sufficiently alleged and proved an 
unreasonable RPM agreement among Mack Trucks and its distributors.240  
The anticompetitive outcomes of RPM predicted in Leegin were cited 
directly, particularly the concerns that “[i]f there is evidence retailers were 
the impetus for a vertical price restraint, there is a greater likelihood that the 
restraint facilitates a retailer cartel” and “that a dominant  
manufacturer . . . can abuse [RPM] for anti-competitive purposes.”241
In Rick-Mik Enterprises v. Equilon Enterprises,
 
242 the Ninth Circuit 
dismissed Rick-Mik’s RPM claim as overly vague under Twombly.243  
Regardless, the court cited Leegin to state that even had the complaint 
adequately alleged that Equilon engaged in price fixing, a vertical RPM 
scheme “is not a valid per se antitrust violation.”244
Although federal courts have applied the rule of reason to RPM claims 
since 2007, the Leegin holding continues to be controversial in public 
policy.  Congress has made several attempts to re-impose the per se ban on 
RPM after Leegin by drafting statutes to repeal Leegin.
 
245  Immediately 
after the decision, Senators Herb Kohl, Joseph Biden, and Hillary Clinton 
introduced the Discount Pricing Consumer Protection Act.246  This bill 
proposed to revise section 1 of the Sherman Act to provide that “[a]ny 
contract, combination, conspiracy or agreement setting a minimum price 
below which a product or service cannot be sold by a retailer, wholesaler, or 
distributor shall violate this Act.”247  Although Senate Bill 2261 never 
made it out of committee, the cause continued.  Senate Bill 75, the Discount 
Pricing Consumer Protection Act, which contains identical language to 
Senate Bill 2261, has been approved by the Senate Judiciary Committee 
but, as of February 2012, has yet to reach a vote in the Senate.248  In the 
House of Representatives, House Bill 3190, the Discount Pricing Consumer 
Protection Act of 2009, contains the same language as its Senate 
counterpart.249  House Bill 3190 passed the House Judiciary committee in 
January 2010 by voice vote, but also has not reached a full vote in the 
House.250  This legislation was reintroduced in 2011 as House Bill 3406.251
 
 239. 530 F.3d 204 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 
 240. See id. at 208–09, 226. 
 241. Id. at 225 (quoting Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc., v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 
877, 897–98 (2007)). 
 242. 532 F.3d 963 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 243. See id. at 975–76. 
 244. Id. at 976. 
 245. See Hubbard, supra note 221, at 41–42. 
 246. Discount Pricing Consumer Protection Act, S. 2261, 110th Cong. (2007); see also 
Hubbard, supra note 221, at 41–42. 
 247. S. 2261, § 3. 
 248. Discount Pricing Consumer Protection Act, S. 75, 112th Cong. (2011), available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-112s75rs/pdf/BILLS-112s75rs.pdf.  Senate Bill 75 is 
cosponsored by Senators Kohl, Feinstein, Durbin, Whitehouse, Klobuchar, Franken, Wyden, 
Schumer, and Blumenthal. Id. 
 249. Discount Pricing Consumer Protection Act of 2009, H.R. 3190, 111th Cong. (2009), 
available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h111-3190. 
 250. See id. 
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2.  State Court Decisions and Legislation After Leegin 
Leegin’s implications are particularly muddled when applied to antitrust 
cases arising under state statutes.  As of April 2011, seventeen states have 
statutes specifically prohibiting resale price maintenance.252 Additionally, 
the common law in several states has established a per se rule against RPM 
that has either been unchallenged or affirmed after Leegin.253  Some states 
have harmonization clauses that indicate that state law is intended to mirror 
federal law and its jurisprudence, but others assert that “federal rulings [are 
not] blindly accepted,” but “serve primarily as ‘guides’ to the interpretation 
and application of state law ‘in the light of the economic and business 
conditions of [the] State.’”254  Courts in some states that proscribe RPM 
have elected to follow rule of reason analysis after Leegin.255  Nonetheless, 
these decisions have been subject to significant scrutiny:  in 2009, forty-one 
state attorneys general wrote to Congress requesting that the Leegin holding 
be overruled.256
New York, Michigan, and Illinois filed a post-Leegin challenge to 
minimum RPM agreements under both federal law and the laws of the three 
states.
 
257  This resulted in a $750,000 settlement within days, and Herman 
Miller, the defendant, agreed not to enter into any future RPM agreements 
and to accept limitations on dealer termination.258  However, the settlement 
and consent decree are not binding and hold no precedential authority in 
New York or otherwise.259
Both New York and California have state antitrust statutes that include 
provisions that allow for lawsuits against vertical price fixers, even after 
 
 
 251. See Discount Pricing Consumer Protection Act of 2011, H.R. 3406, 112th Cong. 
(2011), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-112hr3406ih/pdf/BILLS-112hr
3406ih.pdf. 
 252. States with broad price fixing prohibitions as of April 2011 are:  California, 
Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Maryland, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, 
Nevada, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, South Carolina, Tennessee, and West Virginia. See 
Lindsay, supra note 51. 
 253. See id.; see also Exit A Plus Realty v. Zuniga, 930 A.2d 491, 497 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 2007) (referring to New Jersey’s statutory proscription of RPM after Leegin and 
declaring vertical price fixing agreements per se unenforceable). 
 254. Island Tobacco Co. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 627 P.2d 260, 268 (Haw. 1981). 
 255. See, e.g., Spahr v. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc., No. 2:07-CV-187, 2008 WL 
3914461, at *7, *14 (E.D. Tenn. Aug. 20, 2008) (holding that rule of reason analysis applies 
to challenged minimum RPM agreement under state law). 
 256. See Rosch Remarks, supra note 1, at 20.  Additionally, several states whose state 
antitrust statutes are similar to the federal Sherman Act have drafted or enacted legislation to 
declare RPM illegal under state law. Id. at 19. 
 257. See New York v. Herman Miller, Inc., No. 08-CV-2977, at 7–8 (S.D.N.Y. filed Mar. 
21, 2008) (alleging that Herman Miller, Inc. violated state and federal antitrust law by 
imposing minimum resale prices for retailers). 
 258. New York v. Herman Miller, Inc., No. 08-CV-2977, at 4–11 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 
2008) (stipulated final judgment and consent decree), available at 
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/bureaus/antitrust/pdfs/Signed_FJ.pdf. 
 259. See Eric A. Rosand, Consent Decrees in Welfare Litigation:  The Obstacles to 
Compliance, 28 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 83, 96 (1994) (stating that consent decrees bind 
only the two parties to the degree and thus have no further judicial precedential value). 
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Leegin.260  California state courts have repeatedly confirmed261 the 
illegality of RPM under California’s antitrust statute, the Cartwright Act.262
Recently, the California Attorney General obtained a consent decree 
against Dermaquest, Inc., enjoining violations of the Cartwright Act.
 
263  
This case contested two clear RPM agreements:  the first, a “Distribution 
Agreement,” provided that a distributor could not resell “Product in a price 
structure that yields a Product price at ultimate retail sale below 
Dermaquest’s Suggested Retail Price.”264  The second was a “Reseller 
Agreement,” prohibiting resellers from reselling “Product in a price 
structure that yields a Product price at resale below Dermaquest’s 
Suggested Retail Price.”265  Although both of these policies were held to be 
unenforceable, and Dermaquest was required to cover attorney’s fees and 
other litigation costs, the decree is not binding legal authority and sets no 
precedent.266
In 1975, the New York state legislature amended its Fair Trade Law,
 
267 
the Feld-Crawford Act,268 to state that “[a]ny contract provision that 
purports to restrain a vendee of a commodity from reselling such 
commodity at less than the price stipulated by the vendor or producer shall 
not be enforceable or actionable at law.”269  This section is entitled “Price-
fixing prohibited.”270  In light of Feld-Crawford, “it remains to be seen 
whether New York courts will embrace the more lenient post-Leegin federal 
antitrust approach.”271
The New York Attorney General’s office cited the Feld-Crawford Act in 
People v. Tempur-Pedic International, Inc.,
 
272 alleging that Tempur-
Pedic’s Retail Partner Obligations and Advertising Policies (RPOAP) and 
pricing policies violated the statute.273  Tempur-Pedic had implemented an 
advertising policy requiring the agreement of retailers, as well as a 
unilateral pricing policy.274  The trial court held that the RPOAP was not 
illegal.275
 
 260. See Barr, supra note 
  Although the RPOAP was an agreement, there was no indication 
120, at 3. 
 261. See Mailand v. Burckle, 572 P.2d 1142, 1147 (Cal. 1978) (confirming the per se 
illegality of RPM); Kunert v. Mission Fin. Servs. Corp., 1 Cal. Rptr. 3d 589, 605 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2003) (same). 
 262. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 16700–70 (West 2006). 
 263. Consent Judgment, People v. Dermaquest, Inc., No. 10497526 (Cal. Super. Ct. 
Alameda Cnty. Feb. 23, 2010). 
 264. Complaint ¶ 11, Dermaquest, Inc., No. 10497526. 
 265. Id. ¶ 12. 
 266. See supra note 262 and accompanying text. 
 267. See 2 ABA SEC. ANTITRUST L., STATE ANTITRUST PRACTICE AND STATUTES New 
York, § 35, at 15 (4th ed. 2009). 
 268. See N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 369-a (McKinney 2009). 
 269. Id. 
 270. Id. 
 271. 2 ABA SEC. ANTITRUST L., supra note 267, at 35–36. 
 272. 30 Misc. 3d 986, 2011 N.Y. Slip Op. 21019 (Jan. 14, 2011). 
 273. See id. at 987–90. 
 274. See id. at 989. 
 275. See id. at 996–97. 
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that the purpose was to regulate price.276  Also, the pricing policy did not 
fulfill the statutory elements because it was not the result of an agreement 
or conspiracy.277
In 2009, the Maryland legislature passed a Leegin-repealing statute,
 
278 
expressly rejecting the application of Leegin’s reasoning to the Maryland 
Antitrust Act.279  This amendment stated that “a contract, combination, or 
conspiracy that establishes a minimum price below which a retailer, 
wholesaler, or distributor may not sell a commodity or service is an 
unreasonable restraint of trade or commerce.”280  The legislative history 
and unambiguous text make clear that the intent was to preserve the per se 
rule for RPM.281
B.  Barriers to Successful IMAP Litigation 
 
Under a rule of reason standard, plaintiffs challenging an IMAP policy 
must draft complete and artful pleadings in order to survive motions to 
dismiss.  Initially, courts must establish that RPM is the correct framework 
under which to analyze an IMAP policy.  From there, proving the existence 
of an agreement is challenging even under a per se standard, let alone under 
the rule of reason.282  Many IMAP policies contain express language 
insisting that these policies are purely unilateral.283  It is difficult to provide 
evidence of concerted activity even when such conduct is evident in the 
parties’ course of dealing.284  Finally, a company that does business 
exclusively on the internet presents significant difficulties for plaintiffs in 
defining a relevant market and quantifying antitrust injury.285
 
 276. See id. at 997. 
  Although it 
 277. See id. 
 278. See Maryland Antitrust Act – Establishment of Minimum Sale Price for 
Commodities or Services – Prohibited, S.B. 239, 2009 Leg., 426th Sess. (Md. 2009), 
available at http://mlis.state.md.us/2009rs/bills/sb/sb0239t.pdf; Maryland Antitrust Act – 
Establishment of Minimum Sale Price for Commodities or Services – Prohibited, H.B. 657, 
2009 Leg., 426th Sess. (Md. 2009), available at http://mlis.state.md.us/2009rs/bills/
hb/hb0657t.pdf.  Both were signed into law in April 2009 and became effective on October 
1, 2009. See Barr, supra note 120, at 4 n.31. 
 279. MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW §§ 11-201 to -213 (LexisNexis 2005 & Supp. 2011). 
 280. Id. § 11-204(b). 
 281. See Barr, supra note 120, at 5. 
 282. See, e.g., Jacobs v. Tempur-Pedic Int’l Inc., 626 F.3d 1327 (11th Cir. 2010) (reading 
Leegin and Twombly together to require that RPM plaintiffs meet the plausibility standard 
for all elements of a Sherman Act claim); Benjamin of Forest Hills Realty, Inc. v. Austin 
Sheppard Realty, Inc., 34 A.D.3d 91, 94 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006) (“To state a claim under the 
Donnelly Act, a party must:  (1) identify the relevant product market, (2) describe the nature 
and effects of the purported conspiracy, (3) allege how the economic impact of that 
conspiracy is to restrain trade in the market in question, and (4) show a conspiracy or 
reciprocal relationship between two or more entities.”). 
 283. See Riado Internet Minimum Advertised Price Policy, supra note 2; see also infra 
Part II.C.2. 
 284. See ABA SEC. ANTITRUST L., supra note 74, at 51–89 (discussing the numerous 
relevant factors in establishing conspiracy based on indirect evidence). 
 285. See Jared Kagan, Note, Bricks, Mortar, and Google:  Defining the Relevant Antitrust 
Market for Internet-Based Companies, 55 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 271, 272–73  (2010); see also 
infra Part II.B.3. 
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is possible that one could state a valid antitrust claim for an IMAP policy 
within the existing analytical framework, plaintiffs face an uphill battle. 
1.  Categorization of IMAP Policies as Resale Price Maintenance 
Based on the decisions in Quoizel and Kichler, a persuasive case can be 
made regarding the nature of IMAP policies, despite their inclusion of the 
term “advertising.”  In the Quoizel case, Homecenter.com’s complaint 
included an affidavit from the company’s president, stating that Quoizel 
salespeople have berated him for advertising and selling Quoizel’s products 
below a certain price point.286  Additionally, the plaintiff submitted a letter 
with language indicating that the application of IMAP was about more than 
simply an advertised price.287
2.  Successful Pleading of an Agreement or Conspiracy 
  The inclusion of direct evidence that tends to 
indicate that a manufacturer imposed IMAP to regulate price, and not 
merely advertising, would help to secure classification as RPM.  These 
cases, however, are the first to directly address the issue of IMAP policies, 
as opposed to general advertised pricing.  As such, they may not be 
indicative of the likelihood of similar categorization. 
To bring a successful claim, courts require that plaintiffs “offer a 
plausible theory of conspiracy, supported not only by a showing of 
‘consciously parallel’ conduct but also by evidence of the existence of ‘plus 
factors’ enabling the court to distinguish between unilateral and 
conspiratorial conduct.”288
In executing this policy, Riado will act at all times unilaterally, and will 
neither solicit, consider nor agree to any recommendation, request or 
demand of any other person.  All matters of interpretation and application 
of the terms of this policy and all matters concerning enforcement of this 
policy shall remain with the sole, unilateral authority of Riado.
  IMAP policy language is often particularly 
tortured around the notion of “agreement.”  Additionally, there are 
questions regarding who the parties to an IMAP policy agreement would 
be.  A typical IMAP policy frequently contains a clause asserting that the 
development, implementation, and enforcement of the policy is purely 
unilateral.  For example, the IMAP policy for Riado, a furniture 
manufacturer, states: 
289
Quoizel’s IMAP policy goes even further, stating in a section titled 
“Retail Partner Options” that agreeing to comply or actually complying 




 286. Affidavit of Brian Okin, supra note 
  In the 2007 Kichler case, the 
plaintiffs provided a letter from Kichler stating that the IMAP policy was 
instituted “to help our dealers compete with companies that advertise our 
161, ¶ 10. 
 287. See id. ¶ 10. 
 288. ABA SEC. ANTITRUST L., supra note 74, at 60 (citing Merck-Medco Managed Care 
v. Rite Aid Corp., No. 98-2847, 1999 WL 691840, at *8–9 (4th Cir. 1999)). 
 289. Riado Internet Minimum Advertised Price Policy, supra note 2. 
 290. See supra note 160. 
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products at reduced prices on the web.”291
IMAP policies, by definition, apply only to internet sales.  Depending on 
analysis, this may or may not put a thumb on the scale of the existence of an 
agreement.  Courts are not typically supportive of claims that infer, rather 
than prove, agreement.  They require that a complaint “establish a 
nonnegligible probability that the claim is valid.”
  This type of statement implies 
an agreement between manufacturers and brick-and-mortar retailers to fix 
prices. 
292
3.  Antitrust Harm in a Relevant Market 
 
The internet presents a challenging forum within which a plaintiff must 
establish a relevant market, and specific harms within that market.  “[A] 
relevant market is comprised of a product market and a geographic 
market.”293  In Brown Shoe Co. v. United States,294 the Supreme Court 
required that plaintiffs identify the relevant product and geographic market 
so that a district court can determine the area of competition, and whether 
the alleged unlawful acts have anticompetitive effects in that market.295  
Frequently, it is difficult to define the scope of a particular market:  it must 
be broad enough to completely encompass the alleged harm, but narrow 
enough to only include what is reasonably affected.296  Difficulties arise 
with product interchangeability and blurry geographic boundaries.297
A private plaintiff in an antitrust action must also define the nature and 
extent of antitrust harm inflicted by the policy.
  The 
internet presents nearly unlimited geographic bounds.  Anyone in the world 
could order a product from Homecenter.com.  Additionally, IMAP policies 
may impact several product or service markets:  the market for the 
manufactured product generally, the market for the product online, or, more 
expansively, the online market for all products. 
298  The Supreme Court 
established a two-part test for the requisite antitrust injury in Brunswick 
Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc.299  The harm at issue must be “of the 
type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and . . . flow[] from that 
which makes defendants’ acts unlawful.”300
 
 291. Worldhomecenter.com, Inc. v. L.D. Kichler Co., No. 05-CV-3297, 2007 WL 
963206, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2007). 
  Lost profits from more 
 292. In re Text Messaging Antitrust Litigation, 630 F.3d 622, 629 (7th Cir. 2010). 
 293. See ABA SEC. ANTITRUST L., supra note 73, at 108; SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 
6, at 61. 
 294. 370 U.S. 294 (1962). 
 295. Id. at 324. 
 296. See SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 6, at 61. 
 297. See id. at 61, 64. 
 298. See ABA SEC. ANTITRUST L., PROVING ANTITRUST DAMAGES:  LEGAL AND ECONOMIC 
ISSUES 21 (2d ed. 2010) (stating that plaintiffs must prove that “they were harmed by an 
antitrust violation . . . [and] that their injury is proximately related to the harm and within the 
ambit of the antitrust laws”). 
 299. 429 U.S. 477 (1977). 
 300. Id. at 489. 
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effective competition do not constitute antitrust injury:  the alleged harm 
must come from a decrease in competition, not competition itself.301
It is often difficult and expensive to hire experts to quantify the harm 
experienced.  There is currently little concrete data on the impact of IMAP 
policies in particular, or the strategies utilized by internet sellers to skirt 
them.  Attempts to differentiate the “advertised” price from the “selling” 
price online often involve putting a product into an online shopping cart in 
order to view the price.  Although this type of policy could reasonably deter 
ultimate purchasing, a potential plaintiff would have to collect extensive 
data in order to establish this fact. 
 
C.  Recent Attempts to Challenge IMAP Policies 
Although general RPM has been litigated across the country, very few 
courts have addressed IMAP policies directly.  Recent litigation regarding 
compact disc manufacturers, however, has implied that “price-advertising 
programs that cover virtually all forms of price advertising and could be 
characterized as eliminating the ability of discounters to communicate 
lower resale prices to consumers” could violate antitrust statutes even under 
the rule of reason.302
Once a plaintiff is able to establish that an IMAP policy should be 
analyzed under an RPM framework, he must then adequately plead all the 
requisite elements of an RPM claim.
  This section discusses how IMAP policies could be 
construed either as impermissibly preventing the communication of low 
prices, or sufficiently transparent to allow consumers unimpeded access to 
online discounts. 
303  Due to the uncertainty after Leegin, 
the claim may assert that an IMAP policy is per se illegal, but must also be 
sufficiently pled under the rule of reason.304
The only IMAP policy lawsuits thus far have been brought in New York 
under both federal and state antitrust law.  District courts in the Eastern and 
Western Districts of New York have come to opposite conclusions on 
whether IMAP policies are merely non-price restraints or RPM.
 
305  A New 
York state court in Manhattan analyzed a contested IMAP policy as RPM, 
but dismissed the complaint for failure to state a valid claim.306
 
 301. ABA SEC. ANTITRUST L., supra note 
 
298, at 22. 
 302. ABA SEC. ANTITRUST L., supra note 151, at 63. 
 303. See Worldhomecenter.com, Inc. v. Quoizel, Inc., No. 651444/2010, slip op. at 6–7 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 25, 2011). 
 304. See id. at 7. 
 305. Compare Worldhomecenter.com v. L.D. Kichler Co., No. 05-CV-3297, 2007 WL 
936206, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2007) (classifying an IMAP policy as RPM for analytical 
purposes), with Campbell v. Austin Air Sys., Ltd., 423 F. Supp. 2d 61, 68 n.6 (W.D.N.Y. 
2005) (categorizing an internet advertising policy as a non-price restraint). 
 306. See generally Quoizel, No. 651444/2010. 
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1.  RPM or Not RPM Under Federal Law?  That Is the Question 
In Campbell v. Austin Air Systems, Ltd.,307 a federal court in New York’s 
Western District court held that a contested IMAP policy regulated only 
advertising, and not price.308  Campbell was a distributor of Austin’s air 
filters and cleaners.309  In 2001, Austin imposed an IMAP policy, but 
Campbell refused to comply with the policy, and Austin terminated his 
dealership contract.310  According to the court, “By its plain language, 
Austin’s Internet MAP policy restricts only the minimum price for which a 
dealer could advertise on the Internet. . . . With respect to actual sales 
pricing, the Agreement explicitly states that a dealer may sell Austin Air 
Cleaners for any price.”311
Despite this holding, the Eastern District came to the opposite conclusion 
in Worldhomecenter.com v. Kichler.
 
312  In this motion to dismiss, the court 
stated that IMAP policies could be defined as RPM.313  According to the 
Kichler court, “although facially the IMAP restricts only advertising 
prices . . . it has the concomitant effect of restricting retail prices for 
Internet retailers as well.”314
In New York, Worldhomecenter.com (or Homecenter.com) has 
attempted to bring several state and federal claims against the IMAP 
policies of various manufacturers.
  For this reason, the plaintiff’s Sherman Act 
claim (and related claim under New York’s Donnelly Act) was able to 
survive past the dismissal stage. 
315  Homecenter.com is a New York 
corporation that operates a website to sell home improvement products.  
Sales are made exclusively online, and Homecenter.com asserted that 
products could be sold at “steep discounts” due to reduced overhead costs 
inherent to online distribution.316  At various times, the manufacturers of 
products sold at Homecenter.com, including Kichler Lighting,317 
Quoizel,318 Thermasol,319 and KWC America,320
 
 307. 423 F. Supp. 2d 61. 
 established IMAP 
policies.  Although each company’s IMAP policy differed slightly, they all 
set minimum advertising prices.  Failure to comply with this policy would 
 308. See id. at 68 n.6. 
 309. See id. at 64. 
 310. See id. at 64–65. 
 311. Id. 
 312. Worldhomecenter.com v. L.D. Kichler Co., No. 05-CV-3297, 2007 WL 936206, at 
*5 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2007). 
 313. See id. 
 314. Id. 
 315. See id.; Worldhomecenter.com, Inc. v. Quoizel, Inc., No. 651444/2010, slip op. at 6 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 25 2011). 
 316. See Quoizel, No. 651444/2010, slip op. at 2; see also Amended Complaint ¶ 9, 
Quoizel, No. 651444/2010 (Jan. 28, 2011). 
 317. See Kichler, No. 05-CV-3297. 
 318. See Quoizel, No. 651444/2010. 
 319. See Worldhomecenter.com, Inc. v. Thermasol, Ltd., No. 05 Civ. 3298, 2006 WL 
1896344 (E.D.N.Y. July 10, 2006). 
 320. See Worldhomecenter.com, Inc. v. KWC America, Inc., No. 10 Civ. 7781, 2011 WL 
4352390 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 2011). 
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result in consequences ranging from temporary prohibition of listing or 
selling the manufacturer’s products to the complete termination of a retail 
agreement.321
Homecenter.com’s complaints were dismissed under Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a valid claim.
  When Homecenter.com did not comply, manufacturers took 
action by refusing to fulfill orders and terminating dealership contracts.  
Consequently, Homecenter.com commenced litigation. 
322  Pleading 
deficiencies stemmed mainly from the failure to sufficiently plead a 
conspiracy under the heightened Twombly standard.323  Homecenter.com’s 
primarily failed due to its inability to plausibly establish that IMAP policies 
“operated unreasonably to restrain interstate trade.”324  Homecenter.com 
was able to survive a motion for judgment on the pleadings in its claim 
against Kichler in 2007.  On that motion, the court held that 
Homecenter.com had adequately pled a conspiracy, and that since IMAP 
could be classified as RPM (which was still per se illegal at the time, as 
Leegin was decided in 2007), the requirements of the second prong were 
met as well.325  The issue was later reexamined by the court in 2009, and 
dismissed for failure to state a claim.326  The court determined that 
Homecenter.com did not allege a contract, and was not persuaded by 
Homecenter.com’s argument that a contract could be established by 
Kichler’s course of dealing.327  The court suggested that Homecenter.com 
would have a valid claim in state court, under New York’s Donnelly Act.328
2.  Pleading Problems in State Court 
 
Homecenter.com’s claims in state court against fixture manufacturer 
Quoizel failed as well.  In his decision, Justice Charles E. Ramos classified 
IMAP as RPM, but applied Leegin, holding that RPM was subject to rule of 
reason analysis.329  As Homecenter.com’s complaint only addressed per se 
illegality, it was dismissed with leave to replead the necessary elements of a 
rule of reason claim under the Donnelly Act.330
 
 321. See Quoizel, No. 651444/2011, slip op. at 2; see also Amended Complaint, supra 
note 
  In order to state a valid 
316, ¶ 15. 
 322. See Twombly v. Bell Atl. Corp., 425 F.3d 99, 113 (2d Cir. 2005) (“[A] Section 1 
plaintiff must allege that (1) the defendants were involved in a contract, combination, or 
conspiracy that (2) operated unreasonably to restrain interstate trade, together with the 
factual predicate upon which those assertions are made.”). 
 323. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (holding that, in order to 
bring a successful Sherman Act section 1 claim, a plaintiff must provide “enough fact to 
raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of illegal agreement”). 
 324. Twombly, 425 F.3d at 113. 
 325. See Worldhomecenter.com, Inc. v. L.D. Kichler Co., No. 05-CV-3297, 2007 WL 
963206, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2007). 
 326. See Worldhomecenter.com, Inc. v. L.D. Kichler Co., No. 08-CV-020, 2009 WL 
936675, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2009) (ruling for defendants on Rule 12(c) motion for 
judgment on the pleadings). 
 327. See id. at *4. 
 328. See id. at *5. 
 329. Quoizel, No. 651444/2010, slip op. at 6. 
 330. See id. at 6, 8. 
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Donnelly Act claim, a plaintiff must:  “(1) identify the relevant product 
market, (2) describe the nature and effects of the purported conspiracy, (3) 
allege how the economic impact of that conspiracy is to restrain trade in the 
market in question, and (4) show a conspiracy or reciprocal relationship 
between two or more entities.”331  The claim failed for failure to plead a 
conspiracy.  The court found Quoizel’s IMAP policy to be unilateral, and 
stated that “[a] manufacturer’s independent acts to set minimum resale 
prices, without seeking agreement from its retailers, do not amount to a 
contract.”332
The existing frameworks for analyzing IMAP policies are uncertain even 
when considering traditional resale price maintenance.  Anti-RPM litigants 
must contend with significant confusion regarding the legality of RPM 
under state antitrust laws, growing resistance to the Leegin holding at both 
the state and federal level, and uneven application of the rule of reason.
  Although Homecenter.com was granted leave to replead, 
given the dual barriers of deference to manufacturers under the rule of 
reason and Twombly’s heightened pleading standard, it is unlikely that a 
future claim under the current analytical framework would be successful. 
333
III.  IMAP IS MORE THAN RPM 2.0:  BUILDING A NEW FRAMEWORK 
FOR ANALYSIS OF IMAP POLICIES 
  
Recent attempts to contest IMAP policies have only muddied the waters by 
adding an additional layer of complexity.  Opponents to the imposition of 
IMAP policies must proceed with caution, and have yet to move past the 
stringent requirements of the rule of reason test.  As described above, IMAP 
policies are particularly unlikely to meet the high pleading requirements to 
survive dismissal. 
This part discusses the inadequacy of the current analytical system for 
evaluating resale price maintenance when applied to IMAP policies, and 
recommends an alternative solution.  Part III.A addresses how IMAP 
policies effectively regulate resale prices even though they ostensibly 
address only advertising.  By fixing prices, IMAP policies limit consumer 
choice and result in higher prices and less flexibility for internet purchasers.  
Part III.B discusses how the circumstances and actual effects of IMAP 
policies could be significantly different from those of traditional RPM.  
Initial research and the antitrust harm alleged in recent pleadings indicate 
that the imposition of an IMAP policy can generate negative outcomes that 
do not fall within traditional RPM pro-competitive and anti-competitive 
rationales and concerns.334
 
 331. Benjamin of Forest Hills Realty, Inc. v. Austin Sheppard Realty, Inc., 34 A.D.3d 91, 
94 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 2006) (internal citations omitted). 
 
 332. Quoizel, No. 651444/2010, slip op. at 6 (citing People v. Tempur-Pedic Int’l, Inc., 30 
Misc. 3d 986 (N.Y. 2011)). 
 333. See Douglas H. Ginsburg, Vertical Restraints:  De Facto Legality Under the Rule of 
Reason, 60 ANTITRUST L.J. 67, 71 (1991) (characterizing rule of reason analysis as a de facto 
legality rule for instances of vertical restraints). 
 334. See, e.g., Amended Complaint, supra note 316, ¶ 9. 
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Savvy consumers use the internet to take advantage of its efficiencies and 
lower prices.335
A.  IMAP Policies Effectively Regulate Resale Prices 
and Limit Consumer Choice 
  The use of IMAP policies could jeopardize this critical 
innovation in product distribution, prevent competition online, and create 
barriers to entry for small upstart internet sellers.  For these reasons, Part 
III.C recommends that IMAP policies be analyzed independently under a 
per se illegality standard, with only clear and carefully defined exceptions. 
As the court reasoned in Worldhomecenter.com v. Kichler,336 IMAP 
policies do far more than regulate advertising.  As discussed in Part II, these 
policies prevent retailers from communicating product prices to consumers 
online.337  Viewing a product’s price in a virtual shopping cart allows a 
price to be displayed eventually, but requires at least the same number of 
clicks as going to a competing website or closing an online window 
completely.338
As with RPM, IMAP policies additionally assume that a manufacturer is 
better suited to decide which types of accompanying services—if any—
consumers want.
  Even if large, reputable sites like Amazon.com are not 
affected seriously, the establishment of IMAP policies creates a significant 
barrier for upstart online discounters to enter a product market.  With higher 
barriers to entry for internet retailers, consumers will experience less 
competition online, resulting in higher prices. 
339  Without the meddling of IMAP policies, the market 
should be able to decide that question most effectively by freely permitting 
consumers to choose between low prices and more services.  Online resale 
is an innovative and efficient distribution model, but if consumers feel that 
their needs are not being met or that a site is untrustworthy, they can and 
will return to traditional purchasing at brick-and-mortar stores.340
Scholars often cite the negative impact of free riding, including reduced 
services for consumers,
   
341 but there has been little study into the potential 
positive impact of free riding:  lower costs and higher efficiency at brick-
and-mortar stores.342  A recent study reported that 78 percent of survey 
respondents who use the internet gathered information online before 
purchasing a product from a physical store.343
 
 335. See generally Baker, Marn, & Zawada, supra note 
  If customers could research 
226. 
 336. See Worldhomecenter.com, Inc. v. L.D. Kichler Co., No. 05-CV-3297, 2007 WL 
963206, (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2007).; see also supra Part II.B.1. 
 337. See supra Part I.C.3. 
 338. Consumers who purchase on the internet are price sensitive. See Judith Chevalier & 
Austan Goolsbee, Measuring Prices and Price Competition Online:  Amazon.com and 
BarnesandNoble.com, 1 QUANTITATIVE MARKETING & ECON. 203, 220 (2003). 
 339. For a discussion on free riding and consumer choice, see supra Part I.D.2. 
 340. See Erik Brynjolfsson & Michael D. Smith, Frictionless Commerce? A Comparison 
of Internet and Conventional Retailers, 46 MGMT. SCI. 563, 578–79 (2000) (discussing how 
trust in an internet seller is a factor in purchasing). 
 341. See supra notes 205–08. 
 342. See Lao, supra note 15, at 17. 
 343. See JIM JANSEN, PEW INTERNET PROJECT, ONLINE PRODUCT RESEARCH:  58% OF 
AMERICANS HAVE RESEARCHED A PRODUCT OR SERVICE ONLINE 4 (Sep. 29, 2010), available 
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and compare products online, brick-and-mortar stores would need to invest 
fewer resources in employee training. 
B.  Rule of Reason Analysis for RPM Does Not Capture the Actual Impact 
of IMAP on Retailers 
Rule of reason analysis for RPM, even in its most concrete form, does 
not adequately address the unique concerns about and rationales for IMAP 
policies.  Although IMAP policies and RPM are closely related, the 
differences between them are significant enough to merit alternative 
analysis. 
IMAP policies are anticompetitive not only because they can prevent 
internet vendors from selling a product to consumers at the lowest price, but 
also because they create a new category of online sellers.  Prominent 
websites like Amazon.com store customer information and have the 
sophisticated functionality to handle IMAP policies without losing 
customers, but nevertheless criticize these policies in online forums.  In one 
such forum, an Amazon moderator states: 
[S]ome manufacturers have imposed . . . [IMAP] policies that restrict how 
retail prices may be displayed if they are lower than the 
manufacturer’s . . . price. . . .  Some manufacturers tell us that 
showing . . . prices on . . . our own website is “advertising.”  Others say 
we can’t even show . . . the price . . . until much later in the checkout 
process.  We disagree with these policies.344
Despite Amazon’s distaste for IMAP policies, the only parties who have 
litigated the issue thus far are smaller, less reputable online retailers.
 
345  
These sellers allege significant lasting damages as consumers choose other 
purchasing options rather than put an item in an online shopping cart—
competition is only a click away.346
 
at http://www.pewinternet.org/~/media//Files/Reports/2010/PIP%20Online%20Product%20
Research%20final.pdf; see also Gregory T. Gundlach, Joseph P. Cannon & Kenneth C. 
Manning, Free Riding and Resale Price Maintenance:  Insights from Marketing Research 
and Practice, 55 ANTITRUST BULL. 381 (2010); Peter C. Verhoef, Scott A. Neslin & Björn 
Vroomen, Multichannel Customer Management:  Understanding the Research-Shopper 
Phenomenon, 24 INT’L J. RES. MARKETING 129, 130 (2007) (reporting on a Double Click 
2004 study demonstrating that 43 percent of respondents browsed on the internet prior to in-
store purchase, versus 16 percent who searched at stores prior to purchasing online). 
  It may be true that, for a large online 
vendor like Amazon, the IMAP policy actually has no effect on purchase 
rates.  If this is true, then a large online vendor may actually benefit from an 
IMAP policy:  it can set lower prices than traditional brick-and-mortar 
stores, and profit from the customers that an IMAP policy may dissuade 
from purchasing at a less prominent retailer. 
 344. Welcome to the “Where’s the Price?” Forum, AMAZON.COM, 
http://www.amazon.com/forum/where%20is%20the%20price/ref=cm_cd_ttp_ef_tft_tp?_enc
oding=UTF8&cdForum=FxGDJ62NQQH2Y8&cdThread=Tx3S4NTJ7361EQT. 
 345. Despite IMAP’s ubiquity, as of January 2012, the only IMAP-specific lawsuits that 
have been filed are the Homecenter.com series of cases and Campbell v. Austin Air Systems, 
Ltd. See supra Part II.C. 
 346. See Amended Complaint, supra note 316, ¶ 25. 
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Online retailing has changed the way that manufacturers and retailers 
distribute products, and reflects a major alteration to the market.  A more 
permissive approach to RPM threatens the growth of the industry, and 
particularly small retailers like Homecenter.com.  Banning discounting 
using RPM eliminates the inherent advantage of Internet retailers:  the 
ability to sell for less due to lower operating costs.”347  The Court in Leegin 
was concerned that RPM could forestall innovative and cost-efficient 
distribution methods.  This fear seems to be coming to fruition.  In 
implementing its IMAP policy, Kichler justified its existence in a letter 
stating that “[d]ue to the growth of the Internet . . . we are seeing more and 
more of our distributors losing sales to . . . Internet web sites. . . .  [I]t’s just 
not possible to compete with the prices now being advertised . . . therefore 
we have created this policy to help protect our distributors.”348
Additionally, the Court held in 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy that 
“[m]andatory industrywide resale price fixing is virtually certain to reduce 
interbrand competition as well as intrabrand competition, because it 
prevents manufacturers and wholesalers from allowing or requiring retail 
price competition.”
 
349  Although this holding predates Leegin, it describes a 
particular set of circumstances where there are simply no procompetitive 
justifications for establishing RPM.  In certain industries, 90 percent of the 
market is controlled by IMAP policies.  This description falls precisely in 
line with the kind of conduct that courts have held to be per se illegal.350
It is possible, but not sufficient, to analyze antitrust claims against IMAP 
policies under an advertising framework.  In the late 1990s, the FTC found 
that cooperative advertising programs initiated by record companies were 
illegal under the FTC Act using a rule of reason standard.
 
351  The FTC then 
negotiated consent agreements with the record distributors to restrict the 
implementation of advertising restrictions.  However, the consent 
agreements were in effect for only seven years,352
 
 347. See Lao, supra note 
 and FTC enforcement 
lacks the binding authority of the courts or legislation. 
15, at 19. 
 348. See Worldhomecenter.com v. L.D. Kichler Co., No 05-CV-3297, 2007 WL 963206, 
at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2007). 
 349. 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335, 342 (1987). 
 350. See N. Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) (holding that the “pernicious 
effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue” of Northern Pacific Railway’s 
conduct justified per se proscription); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 19–20 
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 351. See Press Release, FTC, Record Companies Settle FTC Charges of Restraining 
Competition in CD Music Market (May 10, 2000), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/
2000/05/cdpres.shtm.  The FTC Act empowers the FTC to establish and prevent unfair trade 
practices. 15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58 (2006). 
 352. See id. 
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C.  IMAP Policies Should Be Analyzed Independently 
Under a Per Se Standard 
The existing resale price maintenance analytical framework for IMAP 
policies fails small businesses and consumers.  The potential 
anticompetitive implications far outweigh any possible justification offered 
by manufacturers, and it is hardly clear that IMAP policies have the results 
that manufacturers intend.  The unique characteristics of internet retailing, 
the nature of online competition, and the efficiencies inherent in new, 
innovative distribution methods justify an independent standard for analysis 
of IMAP policies in the courts. 
RPM can occur in a variety of ways in the business world.  For this 
reason, and in light of Leegin, it is essential to have a flexible standard of 
review to account for competitive justifications.353  The rule of reason, 
properly applied, helps to achieve the antitrust goal of protecting 
competition, not competitors.354  Conversely, IMAP policies are relatively 
uniform.  Even if RPM is not per se illegal, it is possible to establish a per 
se standard uniquely for IMAP policies.  Courts have created narrow, 
carefully defined exceptions to per se rules in the past to account for 
permissible behavior.355
Professor Marina Lao has recommended that courts apply a rebuttable 
presumption of illegality for RPM agreements generally.  Thus, a prima 
facie case would be established “so long as the plaintiff shows an RPM 
agreement and higher resale prices, and no apparent procompetitive reason 
exists for the agreement.”
 
356
A promotional allowance would present a more efficient and less 
restrictive means of ensuring competitive prices and critical services for 
consumers.
  This reasoning is even more convincing for 
the regulation of IMAP policies.  A broad MAP policy applies to all 
retailers of a product equally and could arguably have little impact on 
competition as a whole; IMAP policies target only products sold online. 
357  Promotional allowances do not restrict prices, but 
compensate retailers for providing services deemed beneficial by a 
manufacturer.358
 
 353. See Pitofsky, supra note 
  A manufacturer would then simply not compensate 
dealers who do not provide services.  Online sellers could elect to continue 
to offer products at low prices, but miss out on supplemental manufacturer 
incentives. 
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With less disruptive alternatives to IMAP policies available and other 
means of permissibly addressing online discounting, IMAP policies lack the 
requisite procompetitive justifications to merit rule of reason analysis.  For 
the above reasons, even if RPM policies are generally subject to the rule of 
reason, courts should find IMAP policies to be illegal per se. 
CONCLUSION 
The proliferation of internet retail sales has created a new paradigm for 
antitrust analysis.  Even as recently as 2007, courts have not effectively 
integrated the nuances of online distribution into their traditional analytical 
framework.  IMAP policies do not fit neatly into RPM jurisprudence, and 
attempts to litigate these policies are stymied by a combination of unclear 
law, challenging pleading standards, and difficulty in classifying the 
contested behavior. 
IMAP policies, like RPM, rise above non-price restraints because they 
can and do impact resale pricing.  However, the imposition of these policies 
can result in higher prices, and unjustifiable limitations on consumer 
options.  For these reasons, IMAP policies should not be subject to rule of 
reason analysis, but instead should be per se illegal under state and federal 
antitrust law. 
 
